Reasons as Defaults

Reasons as Defaults

Volumn , Issue , 2012, Pages 1-272

  Horty, John F ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND   (United States)

Author keywords

Default logic; Defaults; Defeat; Deontic logic; Exclusionary reasons; Floating conclusions; Moral conflicts; Oughts; Particularism; Reasons; Undercutting defeat

Indexed keywords

EID: 84922273873     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199744077.001.0001     Document Type: Book

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