The Nature and Structure of Content

The Nature and Structure of Content

Volumn , Issue , 2007, Pages 1-240

  King, Jeffrey C ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Analytical philosophy; Bertrand Russell; Constituents; G. E. Moore; Gottlob Frege; Metaphysics; Modality; Propositions; Tense

Indexed keywords

EID: 61249381329     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199226061.001.0001     Document Type: Book

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