Occasion-Sensitivity: Selected Essays

Occasion-Sensitivity: Selected Essays

Volumn , Issue , 2008, Pages 1-336

  Travis, Charles ^a  

^a KING'S COLLEGE LONDON   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Correctness; Given Concept; Language; Linguistic Form; Thought; Truth Conditions

Indexed keywords

EID: 73649147800     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199230334.001.0001     Document Type: Book

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