Central-Bank Independence, Economic Behavior, and Optimal Term Lengths

American Economic Review

Volumn 86, Issue 5, 1996, Pages 1139-1153

  Waller, Christopher J ^a,d,e   Walsh, Carl E ^b,c  

^a INDIANA UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^c Research Department   (United States)

^d UNIVERSITY OF MANNHEIM   (Germany)

^e FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST LOUIS   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 1542535054     PISSN: 00028282     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

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