The president versus the senate: Appointments in the American system of separated powers and the federal reserve

Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization

Volumn 17, Issue 2, 2001, Pages 319-355

  Chang, Kelly H ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN MADISON   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035618256     PISSN: 87566222     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/jleo/17.2.319     Document Type: Article

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