Partisan control of the money supply and decentralized appointment powers

European Journal of Political Economy

Volumn 13, Issue 2, 1997, Pages 225-246

  Lohmann, Susanne ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031139009     PISSN: 01762680     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0176-2680(97)00003-7     Document Type: Article

References (25)

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