Whom can we trust to run the Fed? Theoretical support for the founders' views

Journal of Monetary Economics

Volumn 37, Issue 2, 1996, Pages 267-283

  Faust, Jon ^a  

^a Federal Reserve Board Division of International Finance   (United States)

Author keywords

Central bank design; Monetary policy; Voting

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030117133     PISSN: 03043932     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0304-3932(96)90037-9     Document Type: Article

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