Confirmation dynamics: A model of presidential appointments to independent agencies

Journal of Theoretical Politics

Volumn 12, Issue 1, 2000, Pages 91-112

  Nokken, Timothy P ^a   Sala, Brian R ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF HOUSTON   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA CHAMPAIGN   (United States)

Author keywords

Ideological voting; Independent agencies; Presidential appointments; Spatial models

Indexed keywords

EID: 0034424367     PISSN: 09516298     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0951692800012001004     Document Type: Article

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