First branch, or root? the Congress, the President, and the Federal Reserve

Public Choice

Volumn 96, Issue 3-4, 1998, Pages 363-380

  Morris, Irwin ^a   Munger, Michael ^b  

^a TEXAS TECH UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0032379297     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/a:1004982615277     Document Type: Article

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