Presidential reputation and the veto

Economics and Politics

Volumn 9, Issue 1, 1997, Pages 1-26

  McCarty, Nolan M ^a  

^a Och Spine at New York Presbyterian Hospitals   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

BARGAINING; VETO POWER;

EID: 0031419999     PISSN: 09541985     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-0343.00017     Document Type: Article

References (27)

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