The rational enforcement of international law: Solving the sanctioners’ dilemma

International Theory

Volumn 1, Issue 2, 2009, Pages 307-321

  Thompson, Alexander ^a  

^a OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 79956256100     PISSN: 17529719     EISSN: 17529727     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S1752971909990078     Document Type: Article

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