Playing to the home crowd? Symbolic use of economic sanctions in the United States

International Studies Quarterly

Volumn 55, Issue 3, 2011, Pages 787-801

  Whang, Taehee ^a  

^a TEXAS A AND M UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ECONOMIC ANALYSIS; EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS; INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT; LEADERSHIP; POLITICAL ECONOMY; SANCTION;

UNITED STATES;

EID: 80052671266     PISSN: 00208833     EISSN: 14682478     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2478.2011.00668.x     Document Type: Article

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