Treaty compliance and violation

Annual Review of Political Science

Volumn 13, Issue , 2010, Pages 273-296

  Simmons, Beth ^a  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Credible commitments; International cooperation; International law; Self enforcing agreements; Signaling

Indexed keywords

EID: 77952925209     PISSN: 10942939     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1146/annurev.polisci.12.040907.132713     Document Type: Article

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