Preparation of amino acid mixtures for cell-free expression systems

BioTechniques

Volumn 58, Issue 1, 2015, Pages 40-43

  Caschera, Filippo ^a   Noireaux, Vincent ^a  

^a University of Minnesota   (United States)

Author keywords

Amino acid distribution; Amino acid mixtures; Cell free transcription translation; pH

Indexed keywords

AMINO ACID MIXTURE; CYSTEINE; DEGFP; GLYCINE; LEUCINE; PROTEIN; RNA POLYMERASE; T7 RNA POLYMERASE; TRYPTOPHAN; UNCLASSIFIED DRUG; AMINO ACID;

ARTICLE; BIOCHEMICAL EQUIPMENT; CELL FREE EXPRESSION SYSTEM; ESCHERICHIA COLI; GENETIC TRANSCRIPTION AND TRANSLATION; METABOLIC ENGINEERING; NONHUMAN; PH; PLASMID; PROTEIN SYNTHESIS; SEQUENCE ANALYSIS; SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY; TEMPERATURE; CELL FREE SYSTEM; CHEMISTRY; METABOLISM; PROCEDURES;

ESCHERICHIA COLI;

AMINO ACIDS; CELL-FREE SYSTEM; ESCHERICHIA COLI; METABOLIC ENGINEERING;

EID: 84921719146     PISSN: 07366205     EISSN: 19409818     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2144/000114249     Document Type: Article

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