CEO Compensation and Corporate Governance in China

Corporate Governance: An International Review

Volumn 20, Issue 6, 2012, Pages 575-592

  Conyon, Martin J ^a   He, Lerong ^b  

^a LANCASTER UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

^b STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK   (United States)

Author keywords

CEO Pay; China; Corporate Governance; Wage Dynamics

Indexed keywords

EID: 84868583269     PISSN: 09648410     EISSN: 14678683     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8683.2012.00935.x     Document Type: Article

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