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Volumn 34, Issue 5, 2008, Pages 342-353

CEO duality and compensation in the market for corporate control

Author keywords

Acquisitions and mergers; Chief executives; Compensation; Corporate governance; Incentives (psychology)

Indexed keywords


EID: 85015689074     PISSN: 03074358     EISSN: 17587743     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1108/03074350810866216     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (28)

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* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.