Investment opportunities and the structure of executive compensation

Journal of Accounting and Economics

Volumn 21, Issue 3, 1996, Pages 297-318

  Baber, William R ^a   Janakiraman, Surya N ^b   Kang, Sok Hyon ^b  

^a GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Investment opportunities; Management compensation; Performance measures

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030167039     PISSN: 01654101     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/0165-4101(96)00421-1     Document Type: Article

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