The influence of firm- and manager-specific characteristics on the structure of executive compensation

Journal of Corporate Finance

Volumn 7, Issue 2, 2001, Pages 101-123

  Ryan Jr , Harley E ^a   Wiggins III, Roy A ^b  

^a LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b BENTLEY COLLEGE   (United States)

Author keywords

Agency conflicts; Executive compensation; G3; Monitoring

Indexed keywords

EID: 0009949467     PISSN: 09291199     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0929-1199(00)00021-3     Document Type: Article

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