The interactions between R & D investment decisions and compensation policy

Financial Management

Volumn 31, Issue 1, 2002, Pages 5-29

  Ryan Jr , Harley E ^a   Wiggins III, Roy A ^a  

^a LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036339863     PISSN: 00463892     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/3666319     Document Type: Article

References (46)

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21. Institutional ownership and corporate R&D in the computer industry
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23. Specification tests in econometrics
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34. Executive compensation
35. Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have
36. Specification and estimation of a simultaneous-equation model with limited dependent variables
37. The investment decision of the firm under uncertainty and the allocative efficiency of capital markets
38. Corporate control and bank efficiency
39. Using equity participation to support change: Evidence from the biotechnology industry
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42. Do institutional investors exacerbate managerial myopia?
43. Alternative tests of independences between stochastic regressors and disturbances
44. Do corporations award CEO stock options effectively?