Executive compensation structure and corporate governance choices

Journal of Financial Research

Volumn 24, Issue 4, 2001, Pages 495-512

  Harvey, Keith D ^a   Shrieves, Ronald E ^b  

^a BOISE STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF TENNESSEE   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0344032808     PISSN: 02702592     EISSN: 14756803     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1475-6803.2001.tb00827.x     Document Type: Article

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