Games of corruption: How to suppress illegal logging

Journal of Theoretical Biology

Volumn 367, Issue , 2015, Pages 1-13

  Lee, Joung Hun ^a   Sigmund, Karl ^b,c   Dieckmann, Ulf ^c   Iwasa, Yoh ^a  

^a KYUSHU UNIVERSITY   (Japan)

^b UNIVERSITY OF VIENNA   (Austria)

^c INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR APPLIED SYSTEMS ANALYSIS   (Austria)

Author keywords

Bistability; Exploration induced equilibrium; Information; Line segments of equilibria

Indexed keywords

BIODIVERSITY; CORRUPTION; EQUILIBRIUM; FOREST MANAGEMENT; INFORMATION; POLICY STRATEGY; STRATEGIC APPROACH;

ARTICLE; ASYMMETRIC STRATEGY EXPLORATION; CONTROLLED STUDY; COOPERATIVE LINE SEGMENT OF EQUILIBRIUM; CORRUPTION; DEFECTIVE LINE SEGMENT OF EQUILIBRIUM; ECONOMIC ASPECT; ENFORCER; HARVESTER; HARVESTING; HONESTY; ILLEGAL LOGGING; LOGGING; MATHEMATICAL PARAMETERS; PAYOFF; POLICY; SOCIAL ASPECT; SOCIAL LEARNING; SYMMETRIC STRATEGY EXPLORATION; TREE; COOPERATION; ECONOMICS; ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION; FORESTRY; GAME; LEGISLATION AND JURISPRUDENCE; MORALITY; THEORETICAL MODEL; WOOD;

CONSERVATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES; COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; FORESTRY; GAME THEORY; MODELS, THEORETICAL; MORALS; TREES; WOOD;

EID: 84919332811     PISSN: 00225193     EISSN: 10958541     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2014.10.037     Document Type: Article

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