Public goods and voting on formal sanction schemes

Journal of Public Economics

Volumn 95, Issue 9-10, 2011, Pages 1213-1222

  Putterman, Louisa ^a   Tyran, Jean Robert ^b,c   Kamei, Kenjua ^b  

^a BROWN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF VIENNA   (Austria)

^c UNIVERSITY OF COPENHAGEN   (Denmark)

Author keywords

Experiment; Formal sanction; Penalty; Public good; Voluntary contribution; Voting

Indexed keywords

EID: 79961023454     PISSN: 00472727     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2011.05.001     Document Type: Article

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