Runaway selection for cooperation and strict-and-severe punishment

Journal of Theoretical Biology

Volumn 257, Issue 1, 2009, Pages 1-8

  Nakamaru, Mayuko ^a   Dieckmann, Ulf ^b  

^a Tokyo Institute of Technology ^*  (Japan)

^b INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR APPLIED SYSTEMS ANALYSIS   (Austria)

Author keywords

Bootstrapping; Cooperation; Evolution; Lattice structured population; Psychological response; Reaction norm; Social norm; Strict and severe punishment

Indexed keywords

ADAPTATION; BOOTSTRAPPING; COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY; POPULATION STRUCTURE; PSYCHOLOGY; REACTION NORM;

ANIMALS; COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; MODELS, GENETIC; MODELS, PSYCHOLOGICAL; PUNISHMENT; SELECTION (GENETICS); SOCIAL CONFORMITY;

EID: 59649105454     PISSN: 00225193     EISSN: 10958541     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2008.09.004     Document Type: Article

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