Strict or Graduated Punishment? Effect of Punishment Strictness on the Evolution of Cooperation in Continuous Public Goods Games

PLoS ONE

Volumn 8, Issue 3, 2013, Pages

  Shimao, Hajime ^a   Nakamaru, Mayuko ^a  

^a TOKYO INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (Japan)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ARTICLE; CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK; COOPERATION; DISEASE SEVERITY; DYNAMICS; GRADUATED PUNISHMENT; MATHEMATICAL ANALYSIS; MATHEMATICAL MODEL; POPULATION STRUCTURE; PROBABILITY; PROPENSITY SCORE; PUNISHMENT; SIMULATION; SOCIAL EVOLUTION; SOCIAL INTERACTION; SOCIOLOGY;

BEHAVIOR; BIOLOGICAL EVOLUTION; COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; GAME THEORY; HUMANS; INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS; MODELS, THEORETICAL; PUNISHMENT;

EID: 84875525655     PISSN: None     EISSN: 19326203     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0059894     Document Type: Article

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