Patent experimentalism

Virginia Law Review

Volumn 101, Issue 1, 2015, Pages 65-128

  Ouellette, Lisa Larrimore ^a  

^a STANFORD LAW SCHOOL   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84904380632     PISSN: 00426601     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (313)

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189. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Performance and Accountability Report: Fiscal Year 2012, at 10 (2012).
190. David S. Kim & Glenn M. Kubota, Behind the Scenes at the USPTO: Accounting for the Supervisory Patent Examiner, Morrison & Foerster IP Q. Newsl., Summer 2011, at 2.
191. Mark A. Lemley & Bhaven Sampat, Examiner Characteristics and Patent Office Outcomes, 94 Rev. Econ. & Stat. 817, 822 (2012);
192. th ed., rev. 9 2012). A primary examiner I spoke with saw no logistical reason that assignment could not be randomized.
193. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Adoption of Metrics for the Enhancement of Patent Quality: Fiscal Year 2011, at 4 (2010).
194. For the basic requirements for patentability, see 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103, 112 (2012).
195. Full First Action Interview Pilot Program, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, http://www.uspto.gov/patents/init-events/faipp-full.jsp (last visited July 12, 2013);
196. Peer Review Pilot FY2011, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, http://www.uspto.gov/patents/init-events/peerpriorartpilotindex.jsp (last visited July 12, 2013);
197. Press Release, No. 07-19, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, USPTO Celebrates a Decade of Telework (June 4, 2007), available at http://www.uspto.gov/news/pr/2007/07-19.jsp.
198. U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, GAO-07-1102, U.S. Patent and Trademark Office: Hiring Efforts Are Not Sufficient to Reduce the Patent Application Backlog 7 (2007).
199. Arti K. Rai, Growing Pains in the Administrative State: The Patent Office's Troubled Quest for Managerial Control, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2051, 2064-65 (2009).
200. Press Release, No. 10-08, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Recently Announced Changes to USPTO's Examiner Count System Go into Effect (Feb. 18, 2010), available at http://www.uspto.gov/news/pr/2010/10-08.jsp.
201. Angus Deaton, Instruments, Randomization, and Learning About Development, 48 J. Econ. Literature 424, 426, 445 (2010);
202. James J. Heckman & Jeffrey A. Smith, Assessing the Case for Social Experiments, 9 J. Econ. Persp. 85, 86 (1995). But see Abhijit V. Banerjee & Esther Duflo, The Experimental Approach to Development Economics, 1 Ann. Rev. Econ. 151, 152 (2009);
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204. Guido W. Imbens, Better LATE Than Nothing: Some Comments on Deaton (2009) and Heckman and Urzua (2009), 48 J. Econ. Literature 399, 399-400 (2010).
205. Cf. John Goering, Comments on Future Research and Housing Policy, in Choosing a Better Life? Evaluating the Moving to Opportunity Social Experiment 383, 383-401 (John Goering & Judith D. Feins eds., 2003)
206. Eric von Hippel, Democratizing Innovation 112-17 (2005);
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211. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-212 (2012).
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225. Of course, the best SPEs might provide successful informal instruction.
226. Kristin Whitman, Ready or Not, the Cooperative Patent Classification Has Arrived!, Intellogist Blog (July 12, 2012), http://intellogist.wordpress.com/2012/07/12/ready-or-not-the-cooperative-patent-classification-has-arrived.
227. One examiner informed me that the PTO has previously conducted a few training sessions in a roundtable format, where examiners had intense discussions about other ways to conduct prior art searches for sample applications, and that these sessions were very useful.
228. One obstacle to implementing randomized PTO experiments may be the examiners' union, the Patent Office Professional Association. But the union might not object if the PTO makes clear that the average benefits and bonuses for each random group will be the same, and that the experiments will ultimately improve conditions for all examiners.
229. See 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (2012).
230. But see Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059, 1068 (2013).
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252. For example, diversity could allow researchers with socially beneficial projects that are not incentivized under the innovation policy in one jurisdiction to pursue their projects in a different jurisdiction that does incentivize their projects.
253. While there is some limited coordination across research grants, see, e.g., Donors, Int'l Fin. Facility for Immunisation, http://www.iffim.org/donors (last visited July 12, 2013),
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