Trade in ideas: Performance and behavioral properties of markets in patents

Trade in Ideas: Performance and Behavioral Properties of Markets in Patents

Volumn , Issue , 2012, Pages 1-199

  Ullberg, Eskil ^a  

^a GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 84926493451     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4614-1272-4     Document Type: Book

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