The interpretation-construction distinction in patent law

Yale Law Journal

Volumn 123, Issue 3, 2013, Pages 530-614

  Chiang, Tun Jen ^a   Solum, Lawrence B ^b  

^a GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY LAW CENTER   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84890681006     PISSN: 00440094     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (430)

1. See, e.g., James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, Patent Failure: How Judges, Bureaucrats, and Lawyers Put Innovators at Risk 8-11 (2008).
2. Gretchen Ann Bender, Uncertainty and Unpredictability in Patent Litigation: The Time Is Ripe for a Consistent Claim Construction Methodology, 8 J. Intell. Prop. L. 175 (2001).
3. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1743 (2009).
4. Peter S. Menell et al., Patent Claim Construction: A Modern Synthesis and Structured Framework, 25 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 711 (2010).
5. Kimberly A. Moore, Markman Eight Years Later: Is Claim Construction More Predictable?, 9 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 231 (2005).
6. Craig Allen Nard, A Theory of Claim Interpretation, 14 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 1 (2000).
7. David L. Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect? An Empirical Study of Claim Construction Reversal Rates in Patent Cases, 107 Mich. L. Rev. 223 (2008).
8. R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An Empirical Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1105, 1163-70 (2004).
9. See, e.g., Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 396 (Ct. Cl. 1967) ("Claims cannot be clear and unambiguous on their face. ").
10. See, e.g., James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, Patent Failure: How Judges, Bureaucrats, and Lawyers Put Innovators at Risk 8-11 (2008).
11. Dan L. Burk, Dynamic Claim Interpretation, in Intellectual Property and the Common Law 107, 112 (Shyamkrishna Balganesh ed., 2013) ("Due to the inherent ambiguity of language, the boundary remains necessarily indeterminate.... ").
12. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1743 (2009).
13. Peter Lee, Substantive Claim Construction as a Patent Scope Lever, 1 IP Theory 100, 114 (2010) (arguing that "the limitations of language" cause uncertainty).
14. Peter S. Menell et al., Patent Claim Construction: A Modern Synthesis and Structured Framework, 25 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 711 (2010).
15. Sean B. Seymore, The Teaching Function of Patents, 85 Notre Dame L. Rev. 621, 637-38 (2010) (attributing the problem to "the inherent indeterminacy of language").
16. See, e.g., AbTox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 122 F.3d 1019, 1023 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ("[T]he language of the claim frames and ultimately resolves all issues of claim interpretation. ").
17. Russell B. Hill & Frank P. Cote, Ending the Federal Circuit Crapshoot: Emphasizing Plain Meaning in Patent Claim Interpretation, 42 IDEA 1 (2002).
18. Joseph Scott Miller & James A. Hilsenteger, The Proven Key: Roles and Rules for Dictionaries at the Patent Office and the Courts, 54 Am. U. L. Rev. 829, 886-87 (2005).
19. Kristen Osenga, Linguistics and Patent Claim Construction, 38 Rutgers L.J. 61, 63 (2006).
20. See, e.g., Tex. Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1202-03 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (favoring dictionaries).
21. See, e.g., Multiform Desiccants, Inc. v. Medzam, Ltd., 133 F.3d 1473, 1478 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (favoring the specification).
22. Ben Hattenbach, Chickens, Eggs and Other Impediments to Escalating Reliance on Dictionaries in Patent Claim Construction, 85 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc'y 181, 189-90 (2003) (criticizing the Telegenix court's "process of considering dictionaries before specifications").
23. Craig Allen Nard, A Theory of Claim Interpretation, 14 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 1 (2000).
24. Compare Eastman Kodak Co. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 114 F.3d 1547, 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ("The trial court is best situated to gauge the relevance and need for additional evidence to explicate claim terms. ").
25. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1743 (2009).
26. Thomas W. Krause & Heather F. Auyang, What Close Cases and Reversals Reveal About Claim Construction at the Federal Circuit, 12 J. Marshall Rev. Intell. Prop. L. 583, 605 (2013) (arguing that disagreements arise because of policy differences among judges).
27. Jeffrey A. Lefstin, Claim Construction, Appeal, and the Predictability of Interpretive Regimes, 61 U. Miami L. Rev. 1033, 1037 (2007) (arguing that disagreements arise because of "the particular cognitive processes by which legal observers reach legal interpretations").
28. See Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 Const. Comment. 95 (2010).
29. See Randy E. Barnett, Restoring the Lost Constitution: The Presumption of Liberty 118-30 (2004).
30. Keith E. Whittington, Constitutional Construction: Divided Powers and Constitutional Meaning 5-9 (1999).
31. Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 Fordham L. Rev. 453 (2013) (discussing the interpretation-construction distinction in constitutional law).
32. See E. Allan Farnsworth, "Meaning" in the Law of Contracts, 76 Yale L.J. 939, 939-40 (1967).
33. Compare Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509 (1946) (holding that the First Amendment applies to a privately owned company town).
34. Frederick F. Schauer, Hudgens v. NLRB and the Problem of State Action in First Amendment Adjudication, 61 Minn. L. Rev. 433 (1977) (discussing the lines of disagreement in this area).
35. 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
36. 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
37. 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
38. 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
39. Craig Allen Nard, A Theory of Claim Interpretation, 14 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 1 (2000).
40. Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ("[T]he two standards, while complementary, approach a similar problem from different directions. "
41. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006).
42. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006).
43. See ePlus, Inc. v. Lawson Software, Inc., 700 F.3d 509, 519 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (rejecting the argument that "the specification need only disclose those aspects of the claimed invention that do not exist in the prior art").
44. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950) (stating that a rule requiring slavish replication would "convert the protection of the patent grant into a hollow and useless thing").
45. See Robert C. Faber, Faber on Mechanics of Patent Claim Drafting § 10:1.1 (6th ed. 2008) ("The claims should cover the inventor's concept. ").
46. See Robert C. Faber, Faber on Mechanics of Patent Claim Drafting § 10:1.1 (6th ed. 2008) ("The claims should cover the inventor's concept. ").
47. Robert Patrick Merges & John Fitzgerald Duffy, Patent Law and Policy: Cases and Materials 27 (5th ed. 2011).
48. See Milcor Steel Co. v. George A. Fuller Co., 316 U.S. 143, 145-46 (1942) ("[I]t is these claims, not the specifications, that afford the measure of the grant to the patentee. ").
49. There is a narrow exception to this rule, known as the "doctrine of equivalents, " that allows a court to deem an unclaimed product to be infringing if the difference is "insubstantial. " See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 21 (1997).
50. John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The (Unnoticed) Demise of the Doctrine of Equivalents, 59 Stan. L. Rev. 955, 958 (2007).
51. AbTox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 122 F.3d 1019, 1023 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
52. Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 396 (Ct. Cl. 1967) ("No matter how great the temptations of fairness or policy making, courts do not rework claims. They only interpret them. ").
53. SRI Int'l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp., 775 F.2d 1107, 1118 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc) (stating that such a procedure makes patent protection "a matter of judicial whim").
54. Baldwin Graphic Sys., Inc. v. Siebert, Inc., 512 F.3d 1338, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
55. Peter Lee, Substantive Claim Construction as a Patent Scope Lever, 1 IP Theory 100, 114 (2010) (arguing that "the limitations of language" cause uncertainty).
56. August Tech. Corp. v. Camtek, Ltd., 655 F.3d 1278, 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
57. Verizon Servs. Corp. v. Vonage Holdings Corp., 503 F.3d 1295, 1308-09 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
58. PC Connector Solutions LLC v. SmartDisk Corp., 406 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
59. SuperGuide Corp. v. DirecTV Enters., Inc., 358 F.3d 870, 878-79 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
60. See, e.g., Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 396 (Ct. Cl. 1967) ("Claims cannot be clear and unambiguous on their face. ").
61. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1743 (2009).
62. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 376 F.3d 1382, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en banc) (per curiam) (ordering rehearing en banc and directing the parties to discuss, among other things, whether "the public notice function of patent claims [is] better served by referencing primarily to technical and general purpose dictionaries and similar sources to interpret a claim term or by looking primarily to the patentee's use of the term in the specification").
63. See, e.g., Tex. Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1202-03 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
64. See, e.g., Multiform Desiccants, Inc. v. Medzam, Ltd., 133 F.3d 1473, 1478 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ("The best source for understanding a technical term is the specification from which it arose.... ").
65. Craig Allen Nard, A Theory of Claim Interpretation, 14 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 1 (2000).
66. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1743 (2009).
67. Peter Lee, Substantive Claim Construction as a Patent Scope Lever, 1 IP Theory 100, 114 (2010) (arguing that "the limitations of language" cause uncertainty).
68. Oskar Liivak, Rescuing the Invention from the Cult of the Claim, 42 Seton Hall L. Rev. 1, 5 (2012).
69. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1743 (2009).
70. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1743 (2009).
71. 517 U.S. 370, 391 (1996) (holding that claim analysis is to be treated as "purely legal" and "under the authority of the single appeals court").
72. 517 U.S. 370, 391 (1996) (holding that claim analysis is to be treated as "purely legal" and "under the authority of the single appeals court").
73. See, e.g., Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 469 F.3d 1039, 1041 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (Michel, C.J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (arguing for deference to trial courts).
74. Peter S. Menell et al., Patent Claim Construction: A Modern Synthesis and Structured Framework, 25 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 711 (2010).
75. Arti K. Rai, Specialized Trial Courts: Concentrating Expertise on Fact, 17 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 877 (2002).
76. John F. Duffy, On Improving the Legal Process of Claim Interpretation: Administrative Alternatives, 2 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol'y 109, 143-48 (2000) (arguing that courts should refer claim analysis questions to the PTO).
77. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 993 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (Mayer, C.J., concurring) (arguing that claim analysis should be considered a jury question).
78. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1743 (2009).
79. Larry Simon, The Authority of the Constitution and Its Meaning: A Preface to a Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 58 S. Cal. L. Rev. 603, 603 (1985).
80. See, e.g., Robert W. Bennett, Are We All Living Constitutionalists Now?, in Robert W. Bennett & Lawrence B. Solum, Constitutional Originalism: A Debate 165, 172-75 (2011).
81. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1743 (2009).
82. Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. Rev. 204, 207-08 (1980).
83. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court, 1988 Term-Foreword: The Vanishing Constitution, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 43, 90 (1989).
84. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1189, 1196 (1987).
85. Richard A. Primus, When Should Original Meanings Matter?, 107 Mich. L. Rev. 165, 166 (2008) ("By far the dominant position [today] is to regard original meaning as always relevant to constitutional interpretation, albeit only as a factor to be considered alongside other factors. ").
86. Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 256 (2006) ("[T]he law is settled that as a general matter the First Amendment prohibits government officials from subjecting an individual to retaliatory actions, including criminal prosecutions, for speaking out. "
87. N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (holding an injunction against the publication of classified material to be impermissible).
88. See Mark P. Denbeaux, The First Word of the First Amendment, 80 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1156, 1156 (1986) (noting that many lawyers react to the problem by responding "that 'Congress' was an unaccountable slip of the pen by the Founding Fathers, and that no meaning could be attached to it").
89. Daniel J. Hemel, Executive Action and the First Amendment's First Word, 40 Pepp. L. Rev. 601, 602 (2013) (noting that people find an argument that the First Amendment is limited to congressional action to be "frightening" (internal quotation marks omitted).
90. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1743 (2009).
91. E.g., Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, The Subjects of the Constitution, 62 Stan. L. Rev. 1209, 1266 (2010) (stating that "[a]s a matter of grammar and logic, the President... cannot violate" the First Amendment).
92. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1743 (2009).
93. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1743 (2009).
94. See Lawrence B. Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 462, 462-70 (1987).
95. Charles Evans Hughes, Speech at Elmira, New York (May 3, 1907), in Addresses and Papers of Charles Evans Hughes 133, 139 (1908) ("We are under a Constitution, but the Constitution is what the judges say it is.... ").
96. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1743 (2009).
97. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1743 (2009).
98. Peter Lee, Substantive Claim Construction as a Patent Scope Lever, 1 IP Theory 100, 114 (2010) (arguing that "the limitations of language" cause uncertainty).
99. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1743 (2009).
100. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1743 (2009).
101. Mark Kelman, A Guide to Critical Legal Studies 45 (1987) ("While most CLS writers have undoubtedly emphasized the inherent ambiguity of language... the more coherent CLS position has moved away from the tendency... to focus on the limitlessness of interpretations of each verbal command. ").
102. See Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. Cin. L. Rev. 849, 856 (1989).
103. See David A. Strauss, Can Originalism Be Saved?, 92 B.U. L. Rev. 1161, 1165 (2012) (claiming that language is highly manipulable in many situations, outside of precise rules such as the requirement that presidents be thirty-five years old).
104. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1743 (2009).
105. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1743 (2009).
106. Merrill, 94 U.S. at 570.
107. AbTox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 122 F.3d 1019, 1023 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
108. AbTox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 122 F.3d 1019, 1023 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
109. See Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 1733, 1739 (1995) (noting that factions can appear to agree while glossing over substantive disagreements).
110. See Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 1733, 1739 (1995) (noting that factions can appear to agree while glossing over substantive disagreements).
111. William Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet 71 (Barbara A. Mowat & Paul Werstine eds., Simon & Schuster 2011), act 2, sc. 2, l. 36.
112. See, e.g., 1st Cir. R. 30.0(e) (requiring translations of opinions from proceedings in Puerto Rico courts).
113. See, e.g., 1st Cir. R. 30.0(e) (requiring translations of opinions from proceedings in Puerto Rico courts).
114. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1743 (2009).
115. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1743 (2009).
116. See, e.g., Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1454 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc).
117. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1743 (2009).
118. Wang Labs., Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc., 197 F.3d 1377, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ("[T]o decide what the claims [legally] mean is nearly always to decide the case. "
119. Some authors do, however, contest whether such interpretative gaps ever occur. See John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism: A New Theory of Interpretation and the Case Against Construction, 103 Nw. U. L. Rev. 751 (2009).
120. Gary Lawson, Dead Document Walking, 92 B.U. L. Rev. 1225, 1234 (2012).
121. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1743 (2009).
122. The debate between originalists and living constitutionalists can be seen as a dispute about this kind of constitutional construction. Originalists affirm the view that the original meaning of the constitutional text should constrain decisions, limiting the judicial role to gap-filling. Some living constitutionalists believe that other factors can authorize an override of the linguistic meaning of the constitutional text. See Lawrence B. Solum, Faith and Fidelity: Originalism and the Possibility of Constitutional Redemption, 91 Tex. L. Rev. 147, 166-67 (2012) (reviewing Jack M. Balkin, Constitutional Redemption: Political Faith in an Unjust World (2011) and Jack M. Balkin, Living Originalism (2011).
123. See, e.g., James E. Ryan, Laying Claim to the Constitution: The Promise of New Textualism, 97 Va. L. Rev. 1523, 1526 (2011) ("At some level... everyone is and always has been a textualist. ").
124. For example, an advocate is more likely to convince a court to apply the First Amendment to the President by arguing that the word "Congress" is unclear (and should be "interpreted" to cover the President) than by overtly arguing that the constitutional text should be overridden by a judicial decision.
125. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1743 (2009).
126. See Margaret Jane Radin, Boilerplate: The Fine Print, Vanishing Rights, and the Rule of Law 21-24, 31-32 (2013).
127. For a collection of essays presenting a variety of viewpoints, see generally Boilerplate: The Foundation of Market Contracts (Omri Ben-Shahar ed., 2007).
128. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1743 (2009).
129. Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 1173 (1983).
130. See, e.g., Breed v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 385 N.E.2d 1280, 1282-83 (N.Y. 1978).
131. This was carried to the extreme by Chief Justice Traynor in Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 442 P.2d 641, 644-45 (Cal. 1968), where he argued that all text is inherently ambiguous. For the parallel of this move in patent law.
132. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006).
133. Broad claim language is not inevitably favorable to the patentee, in that it also increases the likelihood of the claim being invalidated. See Giles S. Rich, The Proposed Patent Legislation: Some Comments, 35 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 641, 644 (1967).
134. Roger Allan Ford, Patent Invalidity Versus Noninfringement, 99 Cornell L. Rev. (forthcoming 2013) (noting structural barriers to invalidating claims).
135. See, e.g., Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 653 F.3d 1296, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Plager, J., concurring) (observing that "claim drafters... want claims that serve as business weapons and litigation threats" but characterizing the resulting problem as one of "indefinite and ambiguous claims").
136. See, e.g., James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, Patent Failure: How Judges, Bureaucrats, and Lawyers Put Innovators at Risk 8-11 (2008).
137. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1743 (2009).
138. Kristen Osenga, Cooperative Patent Prosecution: Viewing Patents Through a Pragmatics Lens, 85 St. John's L. Rev. 115, 166 (2011) ("More often than not, the inventor submits ambiguous or vague claims with hopes that later interpretation of the claims will provide broader coverage.... ").
139. See, e.g., James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, Patent Failure: How Judges, Bureaucrats, and Lawyers Put Innovators at Risk 8-11 (2008).
140. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1743 (2009).
141. Cf. Timothy A.O. Endicott, Vagueness in Law 57-58 (2000) (giving a similar example of vagueness).
142. See H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 593, 607-08 (1958) (arguing that logical deduction alone cannot resolve cases on the penumbra of legal rules).
143. Webster's New World Medical Dictionary 198 (3d ed. 2008).
144. 579 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
145. AbTox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 122 F.3d 1019, 1023 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
146. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1743 (2009).
147. Christian E. Mammen, Patent Claim Construction as a Form of Legal Interpretation, 12 J. Marshall Rev. Intell. Prop. L. 40, 41 n.2 (2012) ("This article rejects the interpretation-construction distinction as artificial. ").
148. See, e.g., United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop., 532 U.S. 483, 494 n.7 (2001) ("Because federal courts interpret, rather than author, the federal criminal code, we are not at liberty to rewrite it. ").
149. Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 396 (Ct. Cl. 1967) ("No matter how great the temptations of fairness or policy making, courts do not rework claims. They only interpret them. ").
150. Salvano v. Merrill Lynch, 647 N.E.2d 1298, 1302 (N.Y. 1995) ("The court's role is limited to interpretation and enforcement of the terms agreed to by the parties; it does not include the rewriting of their contract.... ").
151. See Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 1359, 1387 (1997) ("'[Y]our decision is what you say it is' would be tautological nonsense as an argument to the Supreme Court. ").
152. See Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 1359, 1387 (1997) ("'[Y]our decision is what you say it is' would be tautological nonsense as an argument to the Supreme Court. ").
153. See Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 1359, 1387 (1997) ("'[Y]our decision is what you say it is' would be tautological nonsense as an argument to the Supreme Court. ").
154. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 14-16 (2012) (arguing that legal analysis can and should "begin[] and end[] with what the text says and fairly implies").
155. See, e.g., Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 442 P.2d 641, 643-44 (Cal. 1968) (arguing against "a primitive faith in the inherent potency and inherent meaning of words" (footnote omitted).
156. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1743 (2009).
157. Richard A. Posner, The Incoherence of Antonin Scalia, New Republic (Aug. 24, 2012), http://www.tnr.com /article/magazine/books-and-arts/106441/scalia-garner-reading-the-law-textual-originalism (arguing that textualism has "all the room needed to generate the outcome that favors Justice Scalia's strongly felt views").
158. Ajinomoto Co. v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 228 F.3d 1338, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2000) ("A patent... presumes a readership skilled in the field of the invention. "). A true cynic might argue that patent claims are not written for skilled artisans but for the judge who adjudicates an infringement dispute.
159. John M. Golden, Construing Patent Claims According to Their "Interpretive Community": A Call for an Attorney-Plus-Artisan Perspective, 21 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 321, 340 (2008).
160. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1743 (2009).
161. Cf. Playtex Prods., Inc. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 400 F.3d 901, 906 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (reasoning that a claim's meaning is assessed as of the filing date).
162. Cf. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 985 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) ("No inquiry as to the subjective intent of the applicant or PTO is appropriate.... "), aff'd, 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
163. See, e.g., Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. 330, 341 (1853) (stating that claims are to be construed according to what the patentee "intended to do").
164. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1743 (2009).
165. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1743 (2009).
166. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1743 (2009).
167. Cf. Markman, 52 F.3d at 985 ("[I]t is not unusual for there to be a significant difference between what an inventor thinks his patented invention is and what the ultimate scope of the claims is.... ").
168. Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 Iowa L. Rev. 539, 566 (2009) ("The legal scope of the patent right is not the same as a technical understanding of the patented invention. ").
169. See, e.g., United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39, 49 (1966) (stating that claims are "to be read with a view to ascertaining the invention").
170. Eibel Process Co. v. Minn. & Ont. Paper Co., 261 U.S. 45, 63 (1923) (stating that courts look for "what the real merit of the alleged discovery or invention is").
171. Tun-Jen Chiang, The Levels of Abstraction Problem in Patent Law, 105 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1097, 1122-24 (2011) (explaining that courts face an inherent judgment call when defining the "invention" for patent scope purposes).
172. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1743 (2009).
173. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1743 (2009).
174. Craig Allen Nard, A Theory of Claim Interpretation, 14 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 1 (2000).
175. More direct evidence of common usage, e.g., a compilation of data about actual usage in newspaper articles or specialized journals, would be the same as or even better than a dictionary definition.
176. See Nix v. Hedden, 149 U.S. 304, 306-07 (1893) (finding that, although a dictionary defined a tomato as a fruit, "in the common language of the people" it was a vegetable).
177. Cf. Timothy R. Holbrook, Patents, Presumptions, and Public Notice, 86 Ind. L.J. 779, 780 (2011) (associating "the understanding of technologists in the relevant field" with extrinsic evidence and "legalistic" conclusions with intrinsic evidence).
178. Cf. Timothy R. Holbrook, Patents, Presumptions, and Public Notice, 86 Ind. L.J. 779, 780 (2011) (associating "the understanding of technologists in the relevant field" with extrinsic evidence and "legalistic" conclusions with intrinsic evidence).
179. Cf. Timothy R. Holbrook, Patents, Presumptions, and Public Notice, 86 Ind. L.J. 779, 780 (2011) (associating "the understanding of technologists in the relevant field" with extrinsic evidence and "legalistic" conclusions with intrinsic evidence).
180. See, e.g., In re Cyclobenzaprine Hydrochloride Extended-Release Capsule Patent Litig., 676 F.3d 1063, 1072 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
181. Ortho-McNeil Pharm., Inc. v. Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd., 476 F.3d 1321, 1326-27 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
182. Young v. Lumenis, Inc., 492 F.3d 1336, 1345-46 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
183. 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
184. U.S. Patent No. 4,677,798 col. 6 ll. 4-5 (filed Apr. 14, 1986).
185. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1310.
186. '798 Patent, at [57].
187. AbTox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 122 F.3d 1019, 1023 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
188. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1310-11.
189. AbTox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 122 F.3d 1019, 1023 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
190. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1328-29 (Lourie, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
191. '798 Patent, at [57].
192. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, The Limits of Claim Differentiation, 22 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1389, 1393 (2007) (criticizing the Phillips majority because "the court interpreted a claim to encompass an embodiment... that would not achieve the purpose of the invention").
193. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1324 (citing a stipulated dictionary definition).
194. AbTox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 122 F.3d 1019, 1023 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
195. Several commentators have argued to us that the linguistic meaning of "baffle" is ambiguous because, accepting that "baffle" refers to any structure that impedes flow, there would still be no infringement in Phillips given that the accused structure was perpendicular to the wall. We agree that one could make this linguistic argument in favor of finding noninfringement in Phillips. Our response is that the argument was not made by the dissent and thus was not the cause of judicial disagreement in the case. Nor does this argument illustrate any ambiguity in the word "baffle. " The argument is saying that the majority determinately erred in applying the linguistic meaning of "baffle, " not that the meaning is indeterminate.
196. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1743 (2009).
197. AbTox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 122 F.3d 1019, 1023 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
198. AbTox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 122 F.3d 1019, 1023 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
199. Martin J. Adelman et al., Cases and Materials on Patent Law 652 (3d ed. 2009).
200. See In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1539 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (noting the PTO's position that "the rules of claim construction in infringement actions differ from the rules for claim interpretation during prosecution in the PTO").
201. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1743 (2009).
202. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1743 (2009).
203. 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc).
204. AbTox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 122 F.3d 1019, 1023 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
205. AbTox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 122 F.3d 1019, 1023 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
206. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1743 (2009).
207. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1743 (2009).
208. Karen C. Mitch, Pondering a "Baffling" Situation: The "Reconstruction" of Claim Construction, 4 J. Marshall Rev. Intell. Prop. L. 623, 631 (2005) (describing "uncertainty" resulting from two conflicting methodologies).
209. Kelly Casey Mullally, Patent Hermeneutics: Form and Substance in Claim Construction, 59 Fla. L. Rev. 333, 356-57 (2007) (distinguishing between the "formalist" and "substantive" approaches).
210. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1743 (2009).
211. Tex. Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1202-03 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
212. Multiform Desiccants, Inc. v. Medzam, Ltd., 133 F.3d 1473, 1478 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
213. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
214. AbTox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 122 F.3d 1019, 1023 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
215. United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39, 49 (1966).
216. see also Gen. Elec. Co. v. Wabash Appliance Corp., 304 U.S. 364, 372 (1938) (framing the question as "whether the language... conveyed definite meaning to those skilled in the art").
217. See, e.g., Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1316.
218. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006).
219. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1743 (2009).
220. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1328-29 (Lourie, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("I fully join the portion of the court's opinion resolving the relative weights of specification and dictionaries in interpreting patent claims.... I could elaborate more expansively on that topic, but Judge Bryson's opinion for the majority says it so well, there is little reason for me to repeat its truths. ").
221. 653 F.3d 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
222. AbTox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 122 F.3d 1019, 1023 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
223. AbTox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 122 F.3d 1019, 1023 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
224. AbTox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 122 F.3d 1019, 1023 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
225. 672 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc).
226. AbTox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 122 F.3d 1019, 1023 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
227. AbTox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 122 F.3d 1019, 1023 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
228. AbTox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 122 F.3d 1019, 1023 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
229. AbTox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 122 F.3d 1019, 1023 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
230. AbTox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 122 F.3d 1019, 1023 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
231. AbTox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 122 F.3d 1019, 1023 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
232. See U.S. Patent No. 6,864,245 col. 71 ll. 57-65 (filed July 11, 2003).
233. AbTox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 122 F.3d 1019, 1023 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
234. Farnsworth made a similar point regarding the conflation of interpretation and construction in contract law. Specifically, he wrote that courts have "often ignored [the interpretationconstruction distinction] by characterizing the process of construction as that of 'interpretation' in order to obscure the extent of their control over private agreement. " E. Allan Farnsworth, Contracts 478 (1982).
235. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1743 (2009).
236. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103, 112 (2006) (outlining the conditions for obtaining a patent).
237. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1743 (2009).
238. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1743 (2009).
239. Peter Lee, Substantive Claim Construction as a Patent Scope Lever, 1 IP Theory 100, 114 (2010) (arguing that "the limitations of language" cause uncertainty).
240. Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach to Patent System Reform, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 1035, 1125-26 (2003) (arguing for measures to "dislodge the Federal Circuit from its rigid adherence to formalism").
241. Compare Honeywell Int'l, Inc. v. Universal Avionics Sys. Corp., 493 F.3d 1358, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Plager, J., dissenting) (arguing for a plain meaning approach even when it causes the invention to be inoperative).
242. See Alexander Volokh, Choosing Interpretive Methods: A Positive Theory of Judges and Everyone Else, 83 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 769, 805 (2008) ("[O]bserving, say, textualist decisions in the world may tell us more about textualists than it tells us about textualism. ").
243. See, e.g., Netword, LLC v. Centraal Corp., 242 F.3d 1347, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2001) ("[C]laims... do not have meaning removed from the context from which they arose. ").
244. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1743 (2009).
245. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1743 (2009).
246. See, e.g., Nystrom v. TREX Co., 424 F.3d 1136, 1145 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (holding that the "ordinary and customary meaning" of a claim term must be discerned by reference to "the context of the intrinsic record" and not by reference to "a dictionary, treatise, or other extrinsic source").
247. See, e.g., Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996) ("The specification contains a written description of the invention.... Thus, the specification is always highly relevant to the claim construction analysis. ").
248. The efficiency standard is the dominant paradigm for determining scope in the patent literature. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989) ("The Patent Clause itself reflects a balance between the need to encourage innovation and the avoidance of monopolies.... ").
249. Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 839 (1990).
250. See, e.g., Multiform Desiccants, Inc. v. Medzam, Ltd., 133 F.3d 1473, 1477-78 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ("It is the person of ordinary skill in the field of the invention through whose eyes the claims are construed. Such person is deemed to read the words used in the patent documents with an understanding of their meaning in the field.... Thus the court starts the decisionmaking process by reviewing the same resources as would that person, viz., the patent specification and the prosecution history. ").
251. See, e.g., Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582 ("The specification contains a written description of the invention.... Thus, the specification is always highly relevant to the claim construction analysis. " (emphasis added).
252. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1743 (2009).
253. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1743 (2009).
254. Peter Lee, Substantive Claim Construction as a Patent Scope Lever, 1 IP Theory 100, 114 (2010) (arguing that "the limitations of language" cause uncertainty).
255. Peter Lee, Substantive Claim Construction as a Patent Scope Lever, 1 IP Theory 100, 114 (2010) (arguing that "the limitations of language" cause uncertainty).
256. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1743 (2009).
257. AbTox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 122 F.3d 1019, 1023 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
258. Christopher A. Cotropia, What Is the "Invention"?, 53 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1855, 1880 (2012) (emphasis added).
259. AbTox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 122 F.3d 1019, 1023 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
260. See, e.g., Tex. Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1202-03 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (emphasizing dictionaries).
261. 554 F.3d 1010 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
262. AbTox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 122 F.3d 1019, 1023 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
263. AbTox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 122 F.3d 1019, 1023 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
264. AbTox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 122 F.3d 1019, 1023 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
265. U.S. Patent No. 5,636,643, col. 11 ll. 9-10 (filed Mar. 9, 1993).
266. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1743 (2009).
267. The prosecution history, although not physically attached to the claims in the manner of the specification, can also provide relevant linguistic context in some circumstances. See, e.g., Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 909 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (noting that a patentee specifically deleted the words "pressure jacket" from many of its claims during prosecution and that this suggested that the resulting claims did not necessarily include a pressure jacket).
268. Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Blue Sky Med. Grp., Inc., 554 F.3d 1010, 1019 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).
269. Turrill v. Mich. S. &c. R.R. Co., 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 491, 510 (1863). Structurally, this idea is similar to the avoidance canon in statutory construction.
270. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1327 (Fed Cir. 2005) (en banc) (stating that the doctrine has not been applied broadly).
271. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608-09 (1950) (describing the reverse doctrine of equivalents).
272. Roche Palo Alto LLC v. Apotex, Inc., 531 F.3d 1372, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ("[T]his court has never affirmed a finding of non-infringement under the reverse doctrine of equivalents. ").
273. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1743 (2009).
274. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1743 (2009).
275. Robert Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and Bargaining Breakdown: The Case of Blocking Patents, 62 Tenn. L. Rev. 75 (1994).
276. See, e.g., James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, Patent Failure: How Judges, Bureaucrats, and Lawyers Put Innovators at Risk 8-11 (2008).
277. 599 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
278. AbTox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 122 F.3d 1019, 1023 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
279. AbTox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 122 F.3d 1019, 1023 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
280. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1743 (2009).
281. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1743 (2009).
282. See, e.g., James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, Patent Failure: How Judges, Bureaucrats, and Lawyers Put Innovators at Risk 8-11 (2008).
283. Herbert Hovenkamp, Innovation and the Domain of Competition Policy, 60 Ala. L. Rev. 103, 120 (2008) (conflating abstraction and vagueness)
284. See, e.g., Young v. Lumenis, Inc., 492 F.3d 1336, 1345-46 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ("near").
285. Power Integrations, Inc. v. Fairchild Semiconductor Int'l, Inc., 763 F. Supp. 2d 671, 682-83 (D. Del. 2010) ("approximately").
286. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1743 (2009).
287. Marine Polymer Techs., Inc. v. HemCon, Inc., 672 F.3d 1350, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc) (opinion of Dyk, J.).
288. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1743 (2009).
289. See Pall Corp. v. Micron Separations, Inc., 66 F.3d 1211, 1217 (Fed. Cir. 1995) ("[T]he word 'about' does not have a universal meaning in patent claims, and... the meaning depends on the technological facts of the particular case. ").
290. See, e.g., Genentech, Inc. v. Wellcome Found. Ltd., 29 F.3d 1555, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (speculating that the patentee may have made "a conscious attempt to create ambiguity about the scope of the claims").
291. See, e.g., James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, Patent Failure: How Judges, Bureaucrats, and Lawyers Put Innovators at Risk 8-11 (2008).
292. See, e.g., James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, Patent Failure: How Judges, Bureaucrats, and Lawyers Put Innovators at Risk 8-11 (2008).
293. See, e.g., James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, Patent Failure: How Judges, Bureaucrats, and Lawyers Put Innovators at Risk 8-11 (2008).
294. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1743 (2009).
295. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1743 (2009).
296. A distinction should be drawn between patentees intentionally using ambiguous language to make a two-faced argument, and patentees invoking ambiguous case law to do so. To the extent that a two-faced argument is based simply on conflicting case law, then interpretative solutions will obviously not work.
297. 315 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
298. AbTox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 122 F.3d 1019, 1023 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
299. AbTox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 122 F.3d 1019, 1023 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
300. AbTox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 122 F.3d 1019, 1023 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
301. AbTox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 122 F.3d 1019, 1023 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
302. AbTox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 122 F.3d 1019, 1023 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
303. AbTox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 122 F.3d 1019, 1023 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
304. PTO examiners are instructed to adopt a "broadest reasonable interpretation" standard when approaching claim language, in order to guard against patentee tricks. In re Yamamoto, 740 F.2d 1569, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
305. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1743 (2009).
306. See, e.g., James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, Patent Failure: How Judges, Bureaucrats, and Lawyers Put Innovators at Risk 8-11 (2008).
307. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1743 (2009).
308. An additional point is that, even if someone were to empirically prove that PTO examiners are regularly deceived by patentee tricks, the obvious solution would be to hire better PTO examiners. It is not obvious that a more drastic solution (such as abolishing claims) is warranted if the problem is deliberate ambiguity.
309. 669 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
310. AbTox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 122 F.3d 1019, 1023 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
311. AbTox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 122 F.3d 1019, 1023 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
312. AbTox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 122 F.3d 1019, 1023 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
313. U.S. Patent No. 6,422,941 col. 33 ll. 14-17 (filed Sept. 23, 1997) (emphasis added).
314. In real life, we can never be certain that a particular ambiguity is irresolvable, because it is always possible that more context will reveal a single correct meaning.
315. 579 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
316. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1743 (2009).
317. The court disagreed with our analysis and held that the "plain meaning of the term 'attached' encompasses either an external or internal attachment. " Thorner, 669 F.3d at 1367. Although we find the court's ultimate decision to be reasonable, we also think its characterization of the meaning as "plain" was an overstatement.
318. 138 F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc).
319. 52 F.3d 967, 971 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (Markman II).
320. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1743 (2009).
321. Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1451.
322. AbTox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 122 F.3d 1019, 1023 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
323. AbTox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 122 F.3d 1019, 1023 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
324. Markman II, 52 F.3d at 974-75 (noting that the substantive question turns on "whether the term 'inventory' requires as part of its meaning 'articles of clothing'").
325. AbTox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 122 F.3d 1019, 1023 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
326. U.S. Patent No. Re. 33,054 (filed Aug. 28, 1987).
327. It is important to distinguish our usage of the specification from that of the anti-textualists. We are making an inference based on ordinary English usage conventions, not based on the patentee's inventive contribution. As a matter of common experience, any document that talks a lot about physical objects, and spends no time talking about cash totals, probably uses "inventory" in the sense of physical objects. In this manner, the general subject matter of the patent (sometimes known as "the invention") can sometimes provide relevant linguistic context. But this is very different from an argument that "inventory" must mean articles of clothing because the patentee only conceived a system to keep track of physical articles and thus is not legally entitled to claim more, which is what anti-textualists usually mean when they argue for interpreting claims according to the "invention. " See Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. 330, 341 (1853) (holding that claims should be interpreted according to what the patentee has a "just right" to cover).
328. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 772 F. Supp. 1535, 1537 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (Markman I) ("Inventory means articles of clothing, not just dollars. ").
329. Markman II, 52 F.3d at 982 (holding the same)
330. Markman II, 52 F.3d at 989 (Mayer, J., concurring) (arguing for deference to juries)
331. Markman II, 52 F.3d at 998 (Rader, J., concurring) (agreeing that "cash transaction totals are not 'inventory'")
332. Markman II, 52 F.3d at 1026 (Newman, J., dissenting) (arguing for a jury determination)
333. Markman III, 517 U.S. at 391 (affirming Federal Circuit).
334. Markman III, 517 U.S. at 372 ("The question here is whether the interpretation of a so-called patent claim... is a matter of law reserved entirely for the court. ").
335. AbTox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 122 F.3d 1019, 1023 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
336. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1743 (2009).
337. We should note that these are separate conditions. Our argument does not require interpretation to be easy, it merely requires interpretation to not be the real issue in dispute.
338. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1743 (2009).
339. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1743 (2009).
340. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1743 (2009).
341. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1743 (2009).
342. Peter S. Menell et al., Patent Claim Construction: A Modern Synthesis and Structured Framework, 25 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 711 (2010).
343. Kimberly A. Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped to Resolve Patent Cases?, 15 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 1, 4 (2001) (arguing for expedited appeal for patent claims given the rate of reversal).
344. Richard S. Gruner, How High Is Too High?: Reflections on the Sources of Claim Construction Reversal Rates at the Federal Circuit, 43 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 981, 985 (2010).
345. See generally George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. Legal Stud. 1 (1984) (describing selection effects).
346. Peter Lee, Substantive Claim Construction as a Patent Scope Lever, 1 IP Theory 100, 114 (2010) (arguing that "the limitations of language" cause uncertainty).
347. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1743 (2009).
348. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1743 (2009).
349. John Shepard Wiley, Jr., Taming Patent: Six Steps for Surviving Scary Patent Cases, 50 UCLA L. Rev. 1413, 1475 (2003) (arguing that patent cases require "technological decisions").
350. Craig Allen Nard, A Theory of Claim Interpretation, 14 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 1 (2000).
351. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1743 (2009).
352. Merrill v. Yeomans, 94 U.S. 568, 570-74 (1876).
353. Markman III, 517 U.S. at 375.
354. Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1456-60 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc).
355. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
356. Marine Polymer Techs., Inc. v. HemCon, Inc., 672 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc).
357. Marine Polymer Techs., Inc. v. HemCon, Inc., 672 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc).
358. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1743 (2009).
359. Craig Allen Nard, A Theory of Claim Interpretation, 14 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 1 (2000).
360. See Jay P. Kesan & Gwendolyn G. Ball, A Study of the Role and Impact of Special Masters in Patent Cases, Fed. Jud. Center (2009), http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup /specmapa.pdf/$file/specmapa.pdf.
361. Peter Lee, Substantive Claim Construction as a Patent Scope Lever, 1 IP Theory 100, 114 (2010) (arguing that "the limitations of language" cause uncertainty).
362. Mark A. Lemley, The Changing Meaning of Patent Claim Terms, 104 Mich. L. Rev. 101, 102 (2005).
363. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006).
364. See Edward Sapir, Language: An Introduction to the Study of Speech 165-66 (1921).
365. Sol Steinmetz, Semantic Antics: How and Why Words Change Meaning (2008).
366. 358 F.3d 870 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
367. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1743 (2009).
368. See Kevin Emerson Collins, The Reach of Literal Claim Scope into After-Arising Technology: On Thing Construction and the Meaning of Meaning, 41 Conn. L. Rev. 493, 537 (2008) (distinguishing between "thing-scope" and "meaning-scope").
369. The distinction between "linguistic meaning" and "the set of real-world objects that fit within the definition" is based on the sense-reference distinction in the philosophy of language. The distinction is from Gottlob Frege. Gottlob Frege, On Sense and Reference, 57 Phil. Rev. 209 (Max Black trans., 1948) (1892).
370. Christopher R. Green, "This Constitution": Constitutional Indexicals as a Basis for Textualist Semi-Originalism, 84 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1607, 1624-28 (2009).
371. PC Connector Solutions LLC v. SmartDisk Corp., 406 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
372. Kopykake Enters., Inc. v. Lucks Co., 264 F.3d 1377, 1383-84 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
373. SuperGuide, 358 F.3d at 897-98 (Michel, J., concurring in the result).
374. 442 P.2d 641 (Cal. 1968).
375. 384 F.2d 391 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
376. AbTox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 122 F.3d 1019, 1023 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
377. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1743 (2009).
378. This is already backwards, because the claim language is the best evidence of what ideas it is trying to convey. To say that one must know the idea before one can understand language is tantamount to saying that communication is impossible without mind-reading. But this conceptual mistake is less important than the court's next move.
379. No. 2012-1014 (Fed. Cir. argued Sept. 13, 2013).
380. We should note that our fundamental claim-that better linguistic tools will not help-still holds even if claims are pervasively vague, even though we do not believe this to be the case. Vagueness, unlike ambiguity, cannot be solved by better interpretative tools.
381. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1743 (2009).
382. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1743 (2009).
383. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1743 (2009).
384. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1743 (2009).
385. Peter Lee, Substantive Claim Construction as a Patent Scope Lever, 1 IP Theory 100, 114 (2010) (arguing that "the limitations of language" cause uncertainty).
386. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1743 (2009).
387. Though we emphasize that this is contestable. As one of us has explained elsewhere, courts are unlikely to have the information to determine the correct scope of a patent. Tun-Jen Chiang, Forcing Patentee Claims (George Mason Univ. Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Paper No. 12-51, 2012), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2130961. Having courts follow biased claims, at least to some extent, may be better than having courts attempt blind stabs at the optimal patent scope.
388. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1743 (2009).
389. Craig Allen Nard, A Theory of Claim Interpretation, 14 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 1 (2000).
390. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1743 (2009).
391. Peter Lee, Substantive Claim Construction as a Patent Scope Lever, 1 IP Theory 100, 114 (2010) (arguing that "the limitations of language" cause uncertainty).
392. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1743 (2009).
393. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1743 (2009).
394. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1743 (2009).
395. Craig Allen Nard, A Theory of Claim Interpretation, 14 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 1 (2000).
396. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1743 (2009).
397. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1743 (2009).
398. Peter Lee, Substantive Claim Construction as a Patent Scope Lever, 1 IP Theory 100, 114 (2010) (arguing that "the limitations of language" cause uncertainty).
399. Craig Allen Nard, A Theory of Claim Interpretation, 14 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 1 (2000).
400. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1743 (2009).
401. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1743 (2009).
402. We are not suggesting that anti-textualists consciously manipulate their argument. The taboo against ignoring clear text is internalized into the lawyer psyche to the extent that it often requires no conscious awareness. Our point is that, even if unconscious, the antitextualist move piggybacks on this political dynamic.
403. Of course, the substantive debates at issue here-textualism versus anti-textualism, broad patents versus narrow patents-are debates that have eluded consensus for centuries. We understand the desire to avoid the quagmire. Our point is that these are the real debates that underlie claim construction disputes. They cannot be avoided.
404. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1743 (2009).
405. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1743 (2009).
406. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1743 (2009).
407. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1743 (2009).
408. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1743 (2009).
409. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1743 (2009).
410. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1743 (2009).
411. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1743 (2009).
412. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1743 (2009).
413. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1743 (2009).
414. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1743 (2009).
415. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1743 (2009).
416. Markman III, 517 U.S. at 391.
417. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1743 (2009).
418. See, e.g., James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, Patent Failure: How Judges, Bureaucrats, and Lawyers Put Innovators at Risk 8-11 (2008).
419. Craig Allen Nard, A Theory of Claim Interpretation, 14 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 1 (2000).
420. Peter S. Menell et al., Patent Claim Construction: A Modern Synthesis and Structured Framework, 25 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 711 (2010).
421. Eileen M. Herlihy, Appellate Review of Patent Claim Construction: Should the Federal Circuit Be Its Own Lexicographer in Matters Related to the Seventh Amendment?, 15 Mich. Telecomm. & Tech. L. Rev. 469, 489, 492-93 (2009).
422. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1743 (2009).
423. No. 2012-1014 (Fed. Cir. argued Sept. 13, 2013).
424. Craig Allen Nard, A Theory of Claim Interpretation, 14 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 1 (2000).
425. Craig Allen Nard, A Theory of Claim Interpretation, 14 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 1 (2000).
426. Markman III, 517 U.S. at 378.
427. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1743 (2009).
428. Peter S. Menell et al., Patent Claim Construction: A Modern Synthesis and Structured Framework, 25 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 711 (2010).
429. Craig Allen Nard, A Theory of Claim Interpretation, 14 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 1 (2000).
430. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1743 (2009).