Advancing the empirical research on lobbying

Annual Review of Political Science

Volumn 17, Issue , 2014, Pages 163-185

  De Figueiredo, John M ^a   Richter, Brian Kelleher ^b  

^a DUKE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN   (United States)

Author keywords

Business government relations; Empirical methods; Interest groups; Lobbyists; Natural experiments; Quasi experimental research design

Indexed keywords

EID: 84901019019     PISSN: 10942939     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1146/annurev-polisci-100711-135308     Document Type: Article

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