When do firms hire lobbyists? The organization of lobbying at the Federal Communications Commission

Industrial and Corporate Change

Volumn 13, Issue 6, 2004, Pages 883-900

  de Figueiredo, John M ^a   Kim, James J ^b  

^a NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH   (United States)

^b NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COMMUNICATION; COMPENSATION; TELECOMMUNICATION; TRANSACTION COST;

EID: 11144346292     PISSN: 09606491     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/icc/dth035     Document Type: Article

References (20)

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