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Volumn 22, Issue 6, 2009, Pages 2331-2360

Do politically connected boards affect firm value

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EID: 67649565535     PISSN: 08939454     EISSN: 14657368     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhn088     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (924)

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* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.