What happens after the alarm? Interest group subsidies to legislative overseers

Journal of Politics

Volumn 70, Issue 4, 2008, Pages 990-1005

  Hall, Richard L ^a   Miler, Kristina C ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA CHAMPAIGN   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 54549105443     PISSN: 00223816     EISSN: 14682508     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0022381608081012     Document Type: Article

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