Trade policy of a free trade agreement in the presence of foreign lobbying

Journal of International Economics

Volumn 77, Issue 1, 2009, Pages 37-49

  Stoyanov, Andrey ^a  

^a YORK UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

Author keywords

Foreign lobbies; Free Trade Areas; Trade policy

Indexed keywords

COMPETITIVENESS; FREE TRADE AREA; NUMERICAL MODEL; POLITICAL ECONOMY; TARIFF STRUCTURE; TRADE BLOC; TRADE POLICY;

CANADA; NORTH AMERICA;

EID: 57849152380     PISSN: 00221996     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2008.10.001     Document Type: Article

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