The decision to lobby bureaucrats

Public Choice

Volumn 147, Issue 1-2, 2011, Pages 123-138

  McKay, Amy Melissa ^a  

^a GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Bureaucracy; Congress; Interest groups; Lobbying; Policymaking

Indexed keywords

EID: 79952193253     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-010-9607-8     Document Type: Article

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