Foreign lobbies and U.S. trade policy

Review of Economics and Statistics

Volumn 88, Issue 3, 2006, Pages 563-571

  Gawande, Kishore ^a   Krishna, Pravin ^b   Robbins, Michael J ^c  

^a TEXAS A AND M UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c Bingham McCutchen LLP ^*  (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33749658201     PISSN: 00346535     EISSN: 15309142     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/rest.88.3.563     Document Type: Article

References (20)

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