Lobbying with conflicting interests: Norwegian local-central relations

European Journal of Political Research

Volumn 47, Issue 2, 2008, Pages 184-205

  Helland, Leif ^a  

^a BI NORWEGIAN BUSINESS SCHOOL   (Norway)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 38849175610     PISSN: 03044130     EISSN: 14756765     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1475-6765.2007.00725.x     Document Type: Article

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