Influencing agencies through pivotal political institutions

Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization

Volumn 20, Issue 2, 2004, Pages 458-483

  Holburn, Guy L F ^a   Bergh, Richard G Vanden ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WESTERN ONTARIO   (Canada)

^b UNIVERSITY OF VERMONT   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 4544369082     PISSN: 87566222     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/jleo/ewh042     Document Type: Article

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