Competition and political organization: Together or alone in lobbying for trade policy?

Journal of International Economics

Volumn 87, Issue 1, 2012, Pages 18-26

  Bombardini, Matilde ^a   Trebbi, Francesco ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA   (Canada)

Author keywords

Collective action; Lobby formation; Product market competition

Indexed keywords

COLLECTIVE ACTION; COMPETITION (ECOLOGY); COMPETITION (ECONOMICS); EXPENDITURE; LOBBYING; OLIGOPOLY; POLITICAL ORGANIZATION; PROFITABILITY; TARIFF STRUCTURE; TRADE POLICY;

UNITED STATES;

EID: 84860275506     PISSN: 00221996     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2011.11.011     Document Type: Article

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