Lobbying and regulation in a political economy: Evidence from the U.S. cellular industry

Public Choice

Volumn 122, Issue 3-4, 2005, Pages 251-276

  Duso, Tomaso ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF VIENNA   (Austria)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 22044454965     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-005-3293-y     Document Type: Article

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