The role of politics in a deliberative model of the administrative state

George Washington Law Review

Volumn 81, Issue 5, 2013, Pages 1397-1457

  Seidenfeld, Mark ^a  

^a FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 84898933576     PISSN: 00168076     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

References (192)

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143. Cf. Stuart Minor Benjamin, Evaluating E-Rulemaking: Public Participation and Political Institutions, 55 DUKE L.J. 893, 931-34 (2006
144. See generally Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1, 21-31 (1997
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149. See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Negotiated Rulemaking Before Federal Agencies: Evaluation of Recommendations by the Administrative Conference of the United States, 74 GEO. L.J. 1625, 1641 (1986
150. Cary Coglianese, Assessing Consensus: The Promise and Performance of Negotiated Rulemaking, 46 DUKE L.J. 1255, 1276-77 (1997
151. Mark Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing, Social Conformity, and Judicial Review of Agency Rulemaking, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 486, 491 (2002
152. See Wendy E. Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1613, 1618-28 (1995
153. Robert L. Glicksman, Bridging Data Gaps Through Modeling and Evaluation of Surrogates: Use of the Best Available Science to Protect Biological Diversity Under the National Forest Management Act, 83 IND. L.J. 465, 471 (2008
154. see also HERBERT A. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR: A STUDY OF DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES IN ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION 47-51 (3d ed. 1976
155. See Cass R. Sunstein, Factions, Self-Interest, and the APA: Four Lessons Since 1946, 72 VA. L. REV. 271, 281 (1986
156. see also Thomas O. McGarity, Substantive and Procedural Discretion in Administrative Resolution of Science Policy Questions: Regulating Carcinogens in EPA and OSHA, 67 GEO. L.J. 729, 743 (1979
157. See Ethan J. Leib, Can Direct Democracy Be Made Deliberative?, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 903, 909-10 (2006
158. see also Elizabeth Garrett & Mathew D. McCubbins, When Voters Make Laws: How Direct Democracy Is Shaping American Cities, 13 PUB. WORKS MGMT. & POL'Y 39, 39, 47 (2008
159. See PETER L. STRAUSS, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 135 (2d ed. 2002
160. MARISSA MARTINO GOLDEN, WHAT MOTIVATED BUREAUCRATS?: POLITICS AND ADMINISTRATION DURING THE REAGAN YEARS 23 (2000
161. See Mark Seidenfeld, Demystifying Deossification: Rethinking Recent Proposals to Mod ify Judicial Review of Notice and Comment Rulemaking, 75 TEX. L. REV. 483, 493-94 (1997
162. cf. Josh Bowers, The Normative Case for Normative Grand Juries, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 319, 333 (2012
163. Timothy W. Floyd, The Lawyer Meets the Therapist, the Minister, and the Psychiatrist: Law School Cross-Professional Collaborations, 63 MERCER L. REV. 959, 967 (2012
164. Charity Scott, Collaborating With the Real World: Opportunities for Developing Skills and Values in Law Teaching, 9 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 411, 432-33 (2012
165. See Bradley Lipton, Note, Accountability, Deference, and the Skidmore Doctrine, 119 YALE L.J. 2096, 2113-14 (2010
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167. William F. West, Formal Procedures, Informal Processes, Accountability, and Responsiveness in Bureaucratic Policy Making: An Institutional Policy Analysis, 64 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 66, 74 (2004
168. E. Donald Elliott, Re-Inventing Rulemaking, 41 DUKE L.J. 1490, 1492-93 (1992
169. See also Matthew C. Stephenson, Mixed Signals: Reconsidering the Political Economy of Judicial Deference to Administrative Agencies, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 657, 667 (2004
170. Independence, Congressional Weakness, and the Importance of Appointment: The Impact of Combining Budgetary Autonomy with Removal Protection, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1822, 1834-35 (2012
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179. Mary M. Cheh, Judicial Supervision of Executive Secrecy: Rethinking Freedom of Expression for Government Employees and the Public Right of Access to Government Information, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 690, 692 n.6 (1984
180. Matthew C. Stephenson, A Costly Signaling Theory of "Hard Look" Judicial Review, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 753, 758 (2006
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182. Cf. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Self-Regulation, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 859, 889 (2009
183. GUIDO PINCIONE & FERNANDO R. TESON, RATIONAL CHOICE AND DEMOCRATIC DELIBERATION: A THEORY OF DISCOURSE FAILURE 18, 217 (2006
184. Kathryn E. Kovacs, Leveling the Deference Playing Field, 90 OR. L. REV. 583, 596 (2011
185. see also Bradley C. Canon & Michael Giles, Recurring Litigants: Federal Agencies Before the Supreme Court, 25 W. POL. Q. 183, 190 (1972
186. Donald W. Crowley, Judicial Review of Administrative Agencies: Does the Type of Agency Matter?, 40 W. POL. Q. 265, 267 (1987
187. Roger Handberg, The Supreme Court and Administrative Agencies: 1965-1978, 6 J. CONTEMP. L. 161, 167, 173 (1979
188. Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The Real World of Arbitrariness Review, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 761, 778 n.86 (2008
189. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Paul Verkuil: An Outstanding Scholar in His Spare Time, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 2445, 2446 (2011
190. Patricia M. Wald, Judicial Review in Midpassage: The Uneasy Partnership Between Courts and Agencies Plays On, 32 TULSA L.J. 221, 235 (1996
191. Cf. Mark Seidenfeld, Strategic Interactions Between Administrative Agencies and the White House: A Welcome Look into the Black Box of the Executive Branch, JOTWELL, (Mar. 6, 2013
192. http://adlaw.jotwell.com/strategic-interactions-between-administrative- agencies-and-thewhite-house-a-welcome-look-into-the-black-box-of-the-executive- branch/