Rational choice and democratic deliberation: A theory of discourse failure

Rational Choice and Democratic Deliberation: A Theory of Discourse Failure

Volumn , Issue , 2006, Pages 1-258

  Pincione, Guido ^a   Tesón, Fernando R ^b  

^a UNIVERSIDAD TORCUATO DI TELLA   (Argentina)

^b FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84925207300     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511720178     Document Type: Book

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