Embracing administrative common law

George Washington Law Review

Volumn 80, Issue 5, 2012, Pages 1293-1370

  Metzger, Gillian E ^a  

^a Columbia Law School ^*  (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84878755022     PISSN: 00168076     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

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