Independence, congressional weakness, and the importance of appointment: The impact of combining budgetary autonomy with removal protection

Harvard Law Review

Volumn 125, Issue 7, 2012, Pages 1822-1843

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EID: 84861383917     PISSN: 0017811X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Note

References (223)

1. While this Note focuses on independent agencies, the term "agency" is also used where the distinction between agency and independent agency is irrelevant.
2. See, e.g., Jacob E. Gersen, Designing Agencies, in Research Handbook on PublicChoice and Public Law 333, 347-48 (Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O'Connell eds., 2010) (defining independent agencies as those with for-cause removal restrictions).
3. Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 2245, 2247 (2001) (same).
4. cf. Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design, 89 Tex. L. Rev. 15, 16-17 (2010) (finding an "obsessive focus on removal as the touchstone of independence, " Id. at 17).
5. cf. Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design, 89 Tex. L. Rev. 15, 16-17 (2010) (finding an "obsessive focus on removal as the touchstone of independence, " Id. at 17).
6. For examples of such articles, see Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power to Execute the Laws, 104 Yale L.J. 541, 583 (1994).
7. Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 421, 492 (1987).
8. See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3146-47 (2010).
9. Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 631-32 (1935).
10. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 106 (1926).
11. See, e.g., FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1815 (2009) (opinion of Scalia, J.) ("[Independent agencies'] freedom from presidential oversight (and protection) has simply been replaced by increased subservience to congressional direction. ").
12. E.g., Guido Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents (1970).
13. Frank H. Easterbrook, The State of Madison's Vision of the State: A Public Choice Perspective, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 1328, 1341 (1994).
14. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, The Executive Unbound 6 (2010) (finding "growing evidence suggesting that presidents often manage to assert effective control over the independent agencies").
15. cf. Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design, 89 Tex. L. Rev. 15, 16-17 (2010) (finding an "obsessive focus on removal as the touchstone of independence, " Id. at 17).
16. For examples of such articles, see Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power to Execute the Laws, 104 Yale L.J. 541, 583 (1994).
17. Frank H. Easterbrook, The State of Madison's Vision of the State: A Public Choice Perspective, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 1328, 1341 (1994).
18. Paul R. Verkuil, Jawboning Administrative Agencies: Ex Parte Contacts by the White House, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 943, 963-64 (1980).
19. See, e.g., Haoran Lu, Presidential Influence on Independent Commissions: A Case of FTC Staffing Levels, 28 Presidential Stud. Q. 51, 51 (1998).
20. Joseph Stewart, Jr. et al., Presidential and Congressional Support for "Independent" Regulatory Commissions: Implications of the Budgetary Process, 35 W. Pol. Q. 318, 318 (1982).
21. Bruce Yandle, Regulators, Legislators and Budget Manipulation, 56 Pub. Choice 167, 172-78 (1988).
22. See, e.g., Daniel P. Carpenter, Adaptive Signal Processing, Hierarchy, and Budgetary Control in Federal Regulation, 90 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 283, 284-87 (1996) (setting out budgetary control models).
23. D. Roderick Kiewiet & Mathew D. McCubbins, Presidential Influence on Congressional Appropriations Decisions, 32 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 713 (1988) (examining presidential control over agency budgets).
24. Michael M. Ting, The "Power of the Purse" and Its Implications for Bureaucratic Policy-Making, 106 Pub. Choice 243, 245-47 (2001) (examining budgetary control models).
25. The term "self-funding" is used in this Note to refer to statutorily provided funding that is not contingent on the appropriations process, such as fees that go directly to the agency or funding from another source.
26. Steven A. Ramirez, Depoliticizing Financial Regulation, 41 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 503, 525 (2000).
27. Narrowly focused agencies exempt from appropriations include the Farm Credit Administration, Farm Credit System Insurance Corporation, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, Federal Housing Finance Agency, Federal Prison Industries, Inc., and Bureau of Engraving and Printing. Narrowly focused agencies that regulate only financial institutions include the National Credit Union Administration, Comptroller of the Currency, and Office of Thrift Supervision. See Survey of Self-Funded Agencies (May 5, 2011) (unpublished survey) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
28. For example, many believe that the Federal Reserve's mission-regulating the monetary system-is a technical judgment that should be outside of politics. See, e.g., Donald F. Kettl, Leadership at the Fed 2-3 (1986).
29. Lisa Schultz Bressman & Robert B. Thompson, The Future of Agency Independence, 63 Vand. L. Rev. 599, 616 (2010).
30. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of the U.S. Code) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act].
31. See Dodd-Frank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 5491(c)(3) (Supp. IV 2011) (providing removal protection).
32. Id. § 5497(a) (providing financial independence). Furthermore, the lack of a multimember board is atypical for independent agencies and will amplify the Director's independence. See Recent Legislation, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 2123, 2128 (2011).
33. See Dodd-Frank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 5497(a)(1) (Supp. IV 2011).
34. U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 7 ("No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law.... ").
35. Jack M. Beermann, Congressional Administration, 43 San Diego L. Rev. 61, 84-85 (2006).
36. See Kate Stith, Congress' Power of the Purse, 97 Yale L.J. 1343, 1356 (1988) ("Federal agencies may not resort to nonappropriation financing because their activities are authorized only to the extent of their appropriations. ").
37. See Kate Stith, Congress' Power of the Purse, 97 Yale L.J. 1343, 1356 (1988) ("Federal agencies may not resort to nonappropriation financing because their activities are authorized only to the extent of their appropriations. ").
38. cf. Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design, 89 Tex. L. Rev. 15, 16-17 (2010) (finding an "obsessive focus on removal as the touchstone of independence, " Id. at 17).
39. See Jonathan Bendor & Terry M. Moe, An Adaptive Model of Bureaucratic Politics, 79 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 755, 756-62 (1985) (modeling how an agency's budget impacts its enforcement levels).
40. Michael M. Ting, The "Power of the Purse" and Its Implications for Bureaucratic Policy-Making, 106 Pub. Choice 243, 245-47 (2001) (examining budgetary control models).
41. cf. Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design, 89 Tex. L. Rev. 15, 16-17 (2010) (finding an "obsessive focus on removal as the touchstone of independence, " Id. at 17).
42. Teresa M. Schwartz, The Consumer Product Safety Commission: A Flawed Product of the Consumer Decade, 51 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 32, 43-44 (1982) (internal quotation marks omitted).
43. Teresa M. Schwartz, The Consumer Product Safety Commission: A Flawed Product of the Consumer Decade, 51 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 32, 43-44 (1982) (internal quotation marks omitted).
44. see also Susan Bartlett Foote, Independent Agencies Under Attack: A Skeptical View of the Importance of the Debate, 1988 Duke L.J. 223, 234.
45. see also Susan Bartlett Foote, Independent Agencies Under Attack: A Skeptical View of the Importance of the Debate, 1988 Duke L.J. 223, 234.
46. See, e.g., Rena Steinzor & Sidney Shapiro, The People's Agents and theBattle to Protect the American Public 3-5 (2010).
47. Jack M. Beermann, Congressional Administration, 43 San Diego L. Rev. 61, 84-85 (2006).
48. See Kate Stith, Congress' Power of the Purse, 97 Yale L.J. 1343, 1356 (1988) ("Federal agencies may not resort to nonappropriation financing because their activities are authorized only to the extent of their appropriations. ").
49. Jack M. Beermann, Congressional Administration, 43 San Diego L. Rev. 61, 84-85 (2006).
50. Jack M. Beermann, Congressional Administration, 43 San Diego L. Rev. 61, 84-85 (2006).
51. see also Susan Rose-Ackerman, Judicial Review and the Power of the Purse, 12 Int'l Rev. L. & Econ. 191, 193 (1992) (arguing that though "[b]oth houses of Congress have rules that forbid the amendment of statutes through appropriations acts... [t]hey are routinely violated or waived").
52. See Kate Stith, Congress' Power of the Purse, 97 Yale L.J. 1343, 1356 (1988) ("Federal agencies may not resort to nonappropriation financing because their activities are authorized only to the extent of their appropriations. ").
53. Cf. Thomas W. Merrill, Rethinking Article I, Section 1: From Nondelegation to Exclusive Delegation, 104 Colum. L. Rev. 2097, 2155 (2004) ("[M]ore and more often, important statutes are rammed through as appropriation riders.... ").
54. J. Gregory Sidak, The President's Power of the Purse, 1989 Duke L.J. 1162, 1206 ("It is generally accepted... that Congress may enact or repeal substantive legislation by means of a rider to an appropriations bill. ").
55. Jack M. Beermann, Congressional Administration, 43 San Diego L. Rev. 61, 84-85 (2006).
56. Jack M. Beermann, Congressional Administration, 43 San Diego L. Rev. 61, 84-85 (2006).
57. See Ty, Inc., 132 F.3d at 1170 (discussing the inference that one may draw regarding copying). See generally Charles E. Carpenter, The Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur, 1 U. Chi. L. Rev. 519 (1934).
58. cf. Barry R. Weingast & Mark J. Moran, Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission, 91 J. Pol. Econ. 765, 793 (1983) (concluding that, when it comes to even nonbudgetary signals of congressional desires, "little ostensible activity by Congress may mask more subtle but nonetheless strong congressional influence").
59. cf. Barry R. Weingast & Mark J. Moran, Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission, 91 J. Pol. Econ. 765, 793 (1983) (concluding that, when it comes to even nonbudgetary signals of congressional desires, "little ostensible activity by Congress may mask more subtle but nonetheless strong congressional influence").
60. cf. Matthew C. Stephenson, Statutory Interpretation by Agencies, in Research Handbook on Public Choice andPublic Law, note 2, at 285, 295 (asserting that, though scholars have dismissed the idea that "agencies are 'budget maximizers[,]'... the weaker assumption that agencies are partly motivated by a desire to preserve or increase their discretionary budget remains compelling").
61. cf. Barry R. Weingast & Mark J. Moran, Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission, 91 J. Pol. Econ. 765, 793 (1983) (concluding that, when it comes to even nonbudgetary signals of congressional desires, "little ostensible activity by Congress may mask more subtle but nonetheless strong congressional influence").
62. Bruce Yandle, Regulators, Legislators and Budget Manipulation, 56 Pub. Choice 167, 172-78 (1988).
63. See, e.g., Haoran Lu, Presidential Influence on Independent Commissions: A Case of FTC Staffing Levels, 28 Presidential Stud. Q. 51, 51 (1998).
64. See Ty, Inc., 132 F.3d at 1170 (discussing the inference that one may draw regarding copying). See generally Charles E. Carpenter, The Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur, 1 U. Chi. L. Rev. 519 (1934).
65. See Ty, Inc., 132 F.3d at 1170 (discussing the inference that one may draw regarding copying). See generally Charles E. Carpenter, The Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur, 1 U. Chi. L. Rev. 519 (1934).
66. See Marshall J. Breger & Gary J. Edles, Established by Practice: The Theory and Operation of Independent Federal Agencies, 52 Admin. L. Rev. 1111, 1151-52 (2000) (discussing the requirements of the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921).
67. See Marshall J. Breger & Gary J. Edles, Established by Practice: The Theory and Operation of Independent Federal Agencies, 52 Admin. L. Rev. 1111, 1151-52 (2000) (discussing the requirements of the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921).
68. Absent statutory interference, the President's influence over agencies through OMB has been recognized as vast. See Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 452, 506 (1989);
69. see also Christopher R. Berry et al., The President and the Distribution of Federal Spending, 104 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 783, 785-86 (2010) (arguing that proposal power gives the President influence).
70. See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 421 (1998) (holding that the Line Item Veto Act of 1996 violated the Presentment Clause).
71. D. Roderick Kiewiet & Mathew D. McCubbins, Presidential Influence on Congressional Appropriations Decisions, 32 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 713 (1988) (examining presidential control over agency budgets).
72. D. Roderick Kiewiet & Mathew D. McCubbins, Presidential Influence on Congressional Appropriations Decisions, 32 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 713 (1988) (examining presidential control over agency budgets).
73. D. Roderick Kiewiet & Mathew D. McCubbins, Presidential Influence on Congressional Appropriations Decisions, 32 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 713 (1988) (examining presidential control over agency budgets).
74. D. Roderick Kiewiet & Mathew D. McCubbins, Presidential Influence on Congressional Appropriations Decisions, 32 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 713 (1988) (examining presidential control over agency budgets).
75. D. Roderick Kiewiet & Mathew D. McCubbins, Presidential Influence on Congressional Appropriations Decisions, 32 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 713 (1988) (examining presidential control over agency budgets).
76. See Elizabeth Garrett, The Congressional Budget Process: Strengthening the Party-in-Government, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 702, 723 (2000) (explaining that congressional party leaders and the President draft budget resolutions in consultation with the committees).
77. cf. Henry L. Chambers, Jr. & Dennis E. Logue, Jr., Separation of Powers and the 1995-1996 Budget Impasse, 16 St. Louis U. Pub. L. Rev. 51, 52 (1996) (noting that budgets blend executive and legislative agendas).
78. Jack M. Beermann, Congressional Administration, 43 San Diego L. Rev. 61, 84-85 (2006).
79. Lisa Schultz Bressman & Robert B. Thompson, The Future of Agency Independence, 63 Vand. L. Rev. 599, 616 (2010).
80. The SEC is an independent agency because the Commissioners are removable only for cause. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3148 (2010) (noting that the parties to the case agreed that Commissioners were only removable for cause).
81. See Karen Buck Burgess et al., Recent Legislative Developments Affecting the Work of the Securities and Exchange Commission-December 29, 2000, in The SEC Speaks in 2001, at 799, 847 (PLI Corporate Law & Practice, Course Handbook Ser. No. 1234, 2001).
82. See 15 U.S.C. § 77f(b)(3) (2006 & Supp. IV 2011) (requiring fees collected under this subsection to be "offsetting collections" and that fees be collected only "to the extent provided in advance in appropriation Acts").
83. See 15 U.S.C. § 77f(b)(3) (2006 & Supp. IV 2011) (requiring fees collected under this subsection to be "offsetting collections" and that fees be collected only "to the extent provided in advance in appropriation Acts").
84. See 15 U.S.C. § 77f(b)(3) (2006 & Supp. IV 2011) (requiring fees collected under this subsection to be "offsetting collections" and that fees be collected only "to the extent provided in advance in appropriation Acts").
85. See 15 U.S.C. § 77f(b)(3) (2006 & Supp. IV 2011) (requiring fees collected under this subsection to be "offsetting collections" and that fees be collected only "to the extent provided in advance in appropriation Acts").
86. See 15 U.S.C. § 77f(b)(3) (2006 & Supp. IV 2011) (requiring fees collected under this subsection to be "offsetting collections" and that fees be collected only "to the extent provided in advance in appropriation Acts").
87. See, e.g., Joel Seligman, Self-Funding for the Securities and Exchange Commission, 28 Nova L. Rev. 233, 240 (2004) (citing Levitt's 1993 request as one of many occasions on which Congress limited the SEC's activities by denying the agency's proposed budget).
88. See, e.g., Joel Seligman, Self-Funding for the Securities and Exchange Commission, 28 Nova L. Rev. 233, 240 (2004) (citing Levitt's 1993 request as one of many occasions on which Congress limited the SEC's activities by denying the agency's proposed budget).
89. See, e.g., Joel Seligman, Self-Funding for the Securities and Exchange Commission, 28 Nova L. Rev. 233, 240 (2004) (citing Levitt's 1993 request as one of many occasions on which Congress limited the SEC's activities by denying the agency's proposed budget).
90. See, e.g., Joel Seligman, Self-Funding for the Securities and Exchange Commission, 28 Nova L. Rev. 233, 240 (2004) (citing Levitt's 1993 request as one of many occasions on which Congress limited the SEC's activities by denying the agency's proposed budget).
91. See Arthur Levitt with Paula Dwyer, Take on the Street 131-32 (2002).
92. See Arthur Levitt with Paula Dwyer, Take on the Street 131-32 (2002).
93. See, e.g., Joel Seligman, Self-Funding for the Securities and Exchange Commission, 28 Nova L. Rev. 233, 240 (2004) (citing Levitt's 1993 request as one of many occasions on which Congress limited the SEC's activities by denying the agency's proposed budget).
94. See, e.g., Joel Seligman, Self-Funding for the Securities and Exchange Commission, 28 Nova L. Rev. 233, 240 (2004) (citing Levitt's 1993 request as one of many occasions on which Congress limited the SEC's activities by denying the agency's proposed budget).
95. see also Steven D. Levitt, Understanding Why Crime Fell in the 1990s: Four Factors that Explain the Decline and Six that Do Not, 18 J. Econ. Persp. 163, 176-83 (2004) (crediting increased imprisonment, increased numbers of police officers, deflated crack markets, and legalized abortion for widespread crime-rate declines during the 1990s).
96. Lisa Schultz Bressman & Robert B. Thompson, The Future of Agency Independence, 63 Vand. L. Rev. 599, 616 (2010).
97. Lisa Schultz Bressman & Robert B. Thompson, The Future of Agency Independence, 63 Vand. L. Rev. 599, 616 (2010).
98. See, e.g., Joel Seligman, Self-Funding for the Securities and Exchange Commission, 28 Nova L. Rev. 233, 240 (2004) (citing Levitt's 1993 request as one of many occasions on which Congress limited the SEC's activities by denying the agency's proposed budget).
99. See, e.g., Joel Seligman, Self-Funding for the Securities and Exchange Commission, 28 Nova L. Rev. 233, 240 (2004) (citing Levitt's 1993 request as one of many occasions on which Congress limited the SEC's activities by denying the agency's proposed budget).
100. Lisa Schultz Bressman & Robert B. Thompson, The Future of Agency Independence, 63 Vand. L. Rev. 599, 616 (2010).
101. Steven A. Ramirez, Depoliticizing Financial Regulation, 41 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 503, 525 (2000).
102. cf. Matthew C. Stephenson, Statutory Interpretation by Agencies, in Research Handbook on Public Choice andPublic Law, note 2, at 285, 295 (asserting that, though scholars have dismissed the idea that "agencies are 'budget maximizers[,]'... the weaker assumption that agencies are partly motivated by a desire to preserve or increase their discretionary budget remains compelling").
103. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 721-22 (1986) (explaining checks and balances).
104. TheFederalist No. 47, at 297-98 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003) (articulating the liberty interest in separating legislative and executive power).
105. Cf. Elizabeth Garrett, Enhancing the Political Safeguards of Federalism? The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, 45 U. Kan. L. Rev. 1113, 1127 (1997).
106. Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 Yale L.J. 969, 1022 (1992).
107. See Michael Edmund O'Neill, A Legislative Scorecard for the United States Senate: Evaluating Legislative Productivity, 36 J. Legis. 297, 299 (2010).
108. See Rui J.P. de Figueiredo, Jr., Electoral Competition, Political Uncertainty, and Policy Insulation, 96 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 321, 322 (2002) (arguing that passing legislation is more difficult in a system with separated powers than in a unicameral system).
109. See Daniel J. Meltzer, The Supreme Court's Judicial Passivity, 2002 Sup. Ct. Rev. 343, 392.
110. Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Filibuster, 49 Stan. L. Rev. 181, 245 (1997).
111. See Daniel J. Meltzer, The Supreme Court's Judicial Passivity, 2002 Sup. Ct. Rev. 343, 392.
112. cf. Barry R. Weingast & Mark J. Moran, Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission, 91 J. Pol. Econ. 765, 793 (1983) (concluding that, when it comes to even nonbudgetary signals of congressional desires, "little ostensible activity by Congress may mask more subtle but nonetheless strong congressional influence").
113. cf. Matthew C. Stephenson, Statutory Interpretation by Agencies, in Research Handbook on Public Choice andPublic Law, note 2, at 285, 295 (asserting that, though scholars have dismissed the idea that "agencies are 'budget maximizers[,]'... the weaker assumption that agencies are partly motivated by a desire to preserve or increase their discretionary budget remains compelling").
114. cf. Matthew C. Stephenson, Statutory Interpretation by Agencies, in Research Handbook on Public Choice andPublic Law, note 2, at 285, 295 (asserting that, though scholars have dismissed the idea that "agencies are 'budget maximizers[,]'... the weaker assumption that agencies are partly motivated by a desire to preserve or increase their discretionary budget remains compelling").
115. 5 U.S.C. §§ 801-808 (2006).
116. Note, The Mysteries of the Congressional Review Act, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 2162, 2163 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
117. Jack M. Beermann, Congressional Administration, 43 San Diego L. Rev. 61, 84-85 (2006).
118. See Neal E. Devins, Regulation of Government Agencies Through Limitation Riders, 1987 Duke L.J. 456, 463 (explaining limitation riders as amendments that prevent funding from being used for a certain purpose).
119. Susan Rose-Ackerman, Truth, Honesty and Corruption: Reflection on the State-Building Process 16 (Yale Law Sch. John M. Olin Ctr. for Studies in Law, Econ., & Pub. Policy, Working Paper No. 255, 2001);
120. Susan Rose-Ackerman, Truth, Honesty and Corruption: Reflection on the State-Building Process 16 (Yale Law Sch. John M. Olin Ctr. for Studies in Law, Econ., & Pub. Policy, Working Paper No. 255, 2001);
121. See Stephen F. Ross, Statutory Interpretation as a Parasitic Endeavor, 44 San Diego L. Rev. 1027, 1042 (2007).
122. U.S. Const. art. II, § 3;
123. See Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 Yale L.J. 1725, 1818-19 (1996).
124. Steven A. Ramirez, Depoliticizing Financial Regulation, 41 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 503, 525 (2000).
125. cf. Barry R. Weingast & Mark J. Moran, Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission, 91 J. Pol. Econ. 765, 793 (1983) (concluding that, when it comes to even nonbudgetary signals of congressional desires, "little ostensible activity by Congress may mask more subtle but nonetheless strong congressional influence").
126. See, e.g., Haoran Lu, Presidential Influence on Independent Commissions: A Case of FTC Staffing Levels, 28 Presidential Stud. Q. 51, 51 (1998).
127. See, e.g., Haoran Lu, Presidential Influence on Independent Commissions: A Case of FTC Staffing Levels, 28 Presidential Stud. Q. 51, 51 (1998).
128. See Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 573, 586 (1984) (identifying ways in which agency officials' behavior may be affected by political pressures).
129. cf. Barry R. Weingast & Mark J. Moran, Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission, 91 J. Pol. Econ. 765, 793 (1983) (concluding that, when it comes to even nonbudgetary signals of congressional desires, "little ostensible activity by Congress may mask more subtle but nonetheless strong congressional influence").
130. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (allowing the President to demand from each executive office an opinion "upon any Subject relating to the Duties of" that office).
131. Lisa Schultz Bressman & Robert B. Thompson, The Future of Agency Independence, 63 Vand. L. Rev. 599, 616 (2010).
132. Absent statutory interference, the President's influence over agencies through OMB has been recognized as vast. See Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 452, 506 (1989);
133. David A. Strauss, The Law and Economics of Racial Discrimination in Employment: The Case for Numerical Standards, 79 Geo. L.J. 1619, 1640 (1991) (discussing a vicious circle of statistical discrimination and employee decisions not to invest in human capital);
134. David A. Strauss, The Law and Economics of Racial Discrimination in Employment: The Case for Numerical Standards, 79 Geo. L.J. 1619, 1640 (1991) (discussing a vicious circle of statistical discrimination and employee decisions not to invest in human capital);
135. David A. Strauss, The Law and Economics of Racial Discrimination in Employment: The Case for Numerical Standards, 79 Geo. L.J. 1619, 1640 (1991) (discussing a vicious circle of statistical discrimination and employee decisions not to invest in human capital);
136. See Richard A. Epstein, The Independence of Judges: The Uses and Limitations of Public Choice Theory, 1990 BYU L. Rev. 827, 838 (expecting that judicial decisions will be "heavily influenced by the intellectual orientation and political inclinations that [judges bring] with them to the bench").
137. Terri Peretti, A Normative Appraisal of Social Scientific Knowledge Regarding Judicial Independence, 64 Ohio St. L.J. 349, 355 (2003) (finding that liberal judges "are significantly more likely to vote in favor of civil rights and civil liberties claims").
138. See David C. Nixon, Separation of Powers and Appointee Ideology, 20 J.L. Econ. & Org. 438, 454 (2004) (finding that "the ideology of an appointee was often the result of a tug-of-war between the president and the Senate").
139. See David C. Nixon, Separation of Powers and Appointee Ideology, 20 J.L. Econ. & Org. 438, 454 (2004) (finding that "the ideology of an appointee was often the result of a tug-of-war between the president and the Senate").
140. see also Emerson H. Tiller & Frank B. Cross, A Modest Proposal for Improving American Justice, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 215, 218 (1999).
141. See Cass R. Sunstein et al., Essay, Ideological Voting on Federal Courts of Appeals: A Preliminary Investigation, 90 Va. L. Rev. 301, 305 (2004) (finding that the President's party "is a fairly good predictor of how individual judges will vote").
142. see also Emerson H. Tiller & Frank B. Cross, A Modest Proposal for Improving American Justice, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 215, 218 (1999).
143. see also Emerson H. Tiller & Frank B. Cross, A Modest Proposal for Improving American Justice, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 215, 218 (1999).
144. Jack M. Beermann, Congressional Administration, 43 San Diego L. Rev. 61, 84-85 (2006).
145. cf. Lloyd N. Cutler & David R. Johnson, Regulation and the Political Process, 84 Yale L.J. 1395, 1410 (1975) (arguing that "few Presidents have used [the power to appoint agency members] effectively").
146. Jack M. Beermann, Congressional Administration, 43 San Diego L. Rev. 61, 84-85 (2006).
147. Jack M. Beermann, Congressional Administration, 43 San Diego L. Rev. 61, 84-85 (2006).
148. See Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 89 (2002) (contending that courtesy to the Senate may constrain the President).
149. Stephan O. Kline, The Topsy-Turvy World of Judicial Confirmations in the Era of Hatch and Lott, 103 Dick. L. Rev. 247, 256 (1999) (quoting Abner Mikva, former White House Counsel, for the idea that the White House will abandon candidates who are sufficiently controversial);
150. See David C. Nixon, Separation of Powers and Appointee Ideology, 20 J.L. Econ. & Org. 438, 454 (2004) (finding that "the ideology of an appointee was often the result of a tug-of-war between the president and the Senate").
151. Absent statutory interference, the President's influence over agencies through OMB has been recognized as vast. See Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 452, 506 (1989);
152. See David C. Nixon, Separation of Powers and Appointee Ideology, 20 J.L. Econ. & Org. 438, 454 (2004) (finding that "the ideology of an appointee was often the result of a tug-of-war between the president and the Senate").
153. Absent statutory interference, the President's influence over agencies through OMB has been recognized as vast. See Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 452, 506 (1989);
154. David A. Strauss, The Law and Economics of Racial Discrimination in Employment: The Case for Numerical Standards, 79 Geo. L.J. 1619, 1640 (1991) (discussing a vicious circle of statistical discrimination and employee decisions not to invest in human capital);
155. cf. Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design, 89 Tex. L. Rev. 15, 16-17 (2010) (finding an "obsessive focus on removal as the touchstone of independence, " Id. at 17).
156. David A. Strauss, The Law and Economics of Racial Discrimination in Employment: The Case for Numerical Standards, 79 Geo. L.J. 1619, 1640 (1991) (discussing a vicious circle of statistical discrimination and employee decisions not to invest in human capital);
157. See Cass R. Sunstein et al., Essay, Ideological Voting on Federal Courts of Appeals: A Preliminary Investigation, 90 Va. L. Rev. 301, 305 (2004) (finding that the President's party "is a fairly good predictor of how individual judges will vote").
158. Terri Peretti, A Normative Appraisal of Social Scientific Knowledge Regarding Judicial Independence, 64 Ohio St. L.J. 349, 355 (2003) (finding that liberal judges "are significantly more likely to vote in favor of civil rights and civil liberties claims").
159. Cf. Harold H. Bruff, Legislative Formality, Administrative Rationality, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 207, 234 (1984) (highlighting that, with regard to agency appointees, "[n]ot all appointees closely conform to the President's views" and tying nominee independence to removal restrictions).
160. Cf. Harold H. Bruff, Legislative Formality, Administrative Rationality, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 207, 234 (1984) (highlighting that, with regard to agency appointees, "[n]ot all appointees closely conform to the President's views" and tying nominee independence to removal restrictions).
161. For example, many believe that the Federal Reserve's mission-regulating the monetary system-is a technical judgment that should be outside of politics. See, e.g., Donald F. Kettl, Leadership at the Fed 2-3 (1986).
162. Steven A. Ramirez, Depoliticizing Financial Regulation, 41 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 503, 525 (2000).
163. For example, many believe that the Federal Reserve's mission-regulating the monetary system-is a technical judgment that should be outside of politics. See, e.g., Donald F. Kettl, Leadership at the Fed 2-3 (1986).
164. Lisa Schultz Bressman & Robert B. Thompson, The Future of Agency Independence, 63 Vand. L. Rev. 599, 616 (2010).
165. For example, many believe that the Federal Reserve's mission-regulating the monetary system-is a technical judgment that should be outside of politics. See, e.g., Donald F. Kettl, Leadership at the Fed 2-3 (1986).
166. For example, many believe that the Federal Reserve's mission-regulating the monetary system-is a technical judgment that should be outside of politics. See, e.g., Donald F. Kettl, Leadership at the Fed 2-3 (1986).
167. see also Bernard Shull, The Fourth Branch 155 (2005) ("During the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Federal Reserve seemed to be in serious jeopardy... [but the Fed] again prevailed.... ").
168. For example, many believe that the Federal Reserve's mission-regulating the monetary system-is a technical judgment that should be outside of politics. See, e.g., Donald F. Kettl, Leadership at the Fed 2-3 (1986).
169. Thomas Havrilesky, The Pressures on American Monetary Policy 17 (2d ed. 1995) (providing numerous examples of failed attempts at congressional influence).
170. Jennifer Liberto, Fed Scores Wins in Wall Street Reform, CNNMoney (May 13, 2010, 3:42 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2010/05/12/news/economy/Fed_Wall_Street_Reform/index.htm.
171. Thomas Havrilesky, The Pressures on American Monetary Policy 17 (2d ed. 1995) (providing numerous examples of failed attempts at congressional influence).
172. Thomas Havrilesky, The Pressures on American Monetary Policy 17 (2d ed. 1995) (providing numerous examples of failed attempts at congressional influence).
173. Thomas Havrilesky, The Pressures on American Monetary Policy 17 (2d ed. 1995) (providing numerous examples of failed attempts at congressional influence).
174. Steven A. Ramirez, Depoliticizing Financial Regulation, 41 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 503, 525 (2000).
175. For example, many believe that the Federal Reserve's mission-regulating the monetary system-is a technical judgment that should be outside of politics. See, e.g., Donald F. Kettl, Leadership at the Fed 2-3 (1986).
176. See, e.g., Joel Seligman, Self-Funding for the Securities and Exchange Commission, 28 Nova L. Rev. 233, 240 (2004) (citing Levitt's 1993 request as one of many occasions on which Congress limited the SEC's activities by denying the agency's proposed budget).
177. Thomas Havrilesky, The Pressures on American Monetary Policy 17 (2d ed. 1995) (providing numerous examples of failed attempts at congressional influence).
178. Lisa Schultz Bressman & Robert B. Thompson, The Future of Agency Independence, 63 Vand. L. Rev. 599, 616 (2010).
179. Lisa Schultz Bressman & Robert B. Thompson, The Future of Agency Independence, 63 Vand. L. Rev. 599, 616 (2010).
180. Thomas Havrilesky, The Pressures on American Monetary Policy 17 (2d ed. 1995) (providing numerous examples of failed attempts at congressional influence).
181. See Richard Dennis, The Policy Preferences of the US Federal Reserve, 21 J. AppliedEconometrics 55, 75 (2006) (hypothesizing that variances in policy during the pre-Volcker era were due to changing Chairmen and their new policy regimes).
182. George A. Krause, Federal Reserve Policy Decision Making: Political and Bureaucratic Influences, 38 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 124, 140 (1994) (finding that appointment combined with persuasion alters the Fed's responsiveness).
183. See Anne M. Khademian, The Pracademic and the Fed: The Leadership of Chairman Benjamin Bernanke, 70 Pub. Admin. Rev. 142, 143 (2010).
184. See Anne M. Khademian, The Pracademic and the Fed: The Leadership of Chairman Benjamin Bernanke, 70 Pub. Admin. Rev. 142, 143 (2010).
185. See, e.g., J.W. Harris, Property and Justice 30-32 (1996).
186. Judicial nominees are an apt comparison to appointees to self-funded independent agencies. First, Article III judges, and many other judges, have removal protection in the form of life tenure. See, e.g., U.S. Const. art. III, § 1. Moreover, Congress faces substantial obstacles to altering this protection-it must amend the Constitution to do so. Though altering protection for selffunded independent agencies is certainly easier than passing a constitutional amendment, it still involves the costs of passing new legislation. This section thus focuses on federal judges, but also includes studies of nonfederal judges because of the probative data.
187. Richard A. Posner, The Supreme Court, 2004 Term-Foreword: A Political Court, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 31, 81 (2005);
188. cf. Lloyd N. Cutler & David R. Johnson, Regulation and the Political Process, 84 Yale L.J. 1395, 1410 (1975) (arguing that "few Presidents have used [the power to appoint agency members] effectively").
189. See Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing Everybody Else Does), 3 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 1, 12 (1993) (analogizing a greater focus on appointment to more elaborate premarital courtship when divorce is difficult).
190. See Vicki C. Jackson, Packages of Judicial Independence: The Selection and Tenure of Article III Judges, 95 Geo. L.J. 965, 978 (2007) (connecting divisive court decisions to intense confirmation battles).
191. Mark Tushnet, The Supreme Court, 1998 Term-Foreword: The New Constitutional Order and the Chastening of Constitutional Aspiration, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 29, 56-57 (1999) (arguing that the Warren Court era witnessed the heightened politics of appointment).
192. Jack M. Beermann, Congressional Administration, 43 San Diego L. Rev. 61, 84-85 (2006).
193. Barry Friedman, The Politics of Judicial Review, 84 Tex. L. Rev. 257, 279 (2005).
194. Letter from Chief Judge Alex Kozinski and Judges of the Ninth Circuit to Senate Leaders 2 (Nov. 15, 2010), available at http://www.legaltimes.typepad.com/files/111510-letter-from-9thcircuit. pdf (writing that "we would be greatly assisted if our judicial vacancies-some of which have been open for several years and declared 'judicial emergencies'-were to be filled promptly") (internal quotation marks omitted).
195. Bruce Moyer, The Judicial Vacancy Crisis Continues, Fed. Law., Sept. 2011, at 8, 8.
196. Bruce Moyer, The Judicial Vacancy Crisis Continues, Fed. Law., Sept. 2011, at 8, 8.
197. See Bert I. Huang, Lightened Scrutiny, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 1109, 1138 (2011) (arguing that vacancies may shape the "actual outcomes" of cases).
198. See, e.g., Carl Tobias, FDA Regulatory Compliance Reconsidered, 93 Cornell L. Rev. 1003, 1027 (2008) (noting that changing views of institutional competence have led to increased receptiveness to regulatory compliance defenses).
199. Bruce Moyer, The Judicial Vacancy Crisis Continues, Fed. Law., Sept. 2011, at 8, 8.
200. Cf. David E. Lewis, The Adverse Consequences of the Politics of Agency Design for Presidential Management in the United States: The Relative Durability of Insulated Agencies, 34 Brit. J. Pol. Sci. 377, 382 (2004) (noting that Congress seeks to limit presidential influence when it believes that the preferences of future Presidents will deviate from those of the current Congress).
201. See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 111-176, at 163-64 (2010) (Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs report arguing for self-funding as necessary to preserve agency independence).
202. 156 Cong. Rec. S4078 (daily ed. May 20, 2010) (Senate vote).
203. Cong. Rec. H14,804 (daily ed. Dec. 11, 2009) (House vote).
204. See Jim Puzzanghera, Consumer Bureau Nominee Richard Cordray Backed by 37 State AGs, L.A. Times (Oct. 18, 2011), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/money_co/2011/10/consumer-bureau-nominee-richard-cordray-attorneys-general.html.
205. Alain Sherter, Why Liz Warren Won't Be Leading the Consumer Financial-Protection Charge, CBS News (July 18, 2011, 1:50 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-505123_162-43554840/why-liz-warren-wont-be-leading-the-consumer-financial-protection-charge.
206. See Maya Jackson Randall, Consumer Bureau Adds to Its Roster, Wall St. J., Oct. 20, 2011, at A6 ("Senate Republicans, who say the bureau has too much power, have stalled the nomination.... ").
207. See Jim Puzzanghera, Consumer Bureau Nominee Richard Cordray Backed by 37 State AGs, L.A. Times (Oct. 18, 2011), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/money_co/2011/10/consumer-bureau-nominee-richard-cordray-attorneys-general.html.
208. See Laura Litvan, Republican Senators Question Holder on Cordray Appointment, Bloomberg Businessweek (Jan. 12, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-01-12/republican-senators-question-holder-on-cordray-appointment.html.
209. Appointments of the Chairman have displayed low levels of dissent and high continuity between parties.
210. See, e.g., J.W. Harris, Property and Justice 30-32 (1996).
211. For example, many believe that the Federal Reserve's mission-regulating the monetary system-is a technical judgment that should be outside of politics. See, e.g., Donald F. Kettl, Leadership at the Fed 2-3 (1986).
212. See Laura Litvan, Republican Senators Question Holder on Cordray Appointment, Bloomberg Businessweek (Jan. 12, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-01-12/republican-senators-question-holder-on-cordray-appointment.html.
213. see also Bernard Shull, The Fourth Branch 155 (2005) ("During the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Federal Reserve seemed to be in serious jeopardy... [but the Fed] again prevailed.... ").
214. See Laura Litvan, Republican Senators Question Holder on Cordray Appointment, Bloomberg Businessweek (Jan. 12, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-01-12/republican-senators-question-holder-on-cordray-appointment.html.
215. See Laura Litvan, Republican Senators Question Holder on Cordray Appointment, Bloomberg Businessweek (Jan. 12, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-01-12/republican-senators-question-holder-on-cordray-appointment.html.
216. See, e.g., J.W. Harris, Property and Justice 30-32 (1996).
217. For example, many believe that the Federal Reserve's mission-regulating the monetary system-is a technical judgment that should be outside of politics. See, e.g., Donald F. Kettl, Leadership at the Fed 2-3 (1986).
218. See, e.g., Rena Steinzor & Sidney Shapiro, The People's Agents and theBattle to Protect the American Public 3-5 (2010).
219. See, e.g., B. Dan Wood & Richard W. Waterman, The Dynamics of Political Control of the Bureaucracy, 85 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 801, 822 (1991) (providing examples of multiple agencies changing course after an appointment by a new President).
220. See Jim Puzzanghera, Consumer Bureau Nominee Richard Cordray Backed by 37 State AGs, L.A. Times (Oct. 18, 2011), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/money_co/2011/10/consumer-bureau-nominee-richard-cordray-attorneys-general.html.
221. See Jim Puzzanghera, Consumer Bureau Nominee Richard Cordray Backed by 37 State AGs, L.A. Times (Oct. 18, 2011), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/money_co/2011/10/consumer-bureau-nominee-richard-cordray-attorneys-general.html.
222. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(g) (2006 & Supp. IV 2011) (outlining prohibited activities for auditors).
223. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(g) (2006 & Supp. IV 2011) (outlining prohibited activities for auditors).