The logical outgrowth doctrine in rulemaking

Administrative Law Review

Volumn 48, Issue 2, 1996, Pages 213-

  Kannan, Phillip M ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0345986757     PISSN: 00018368     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (7)

1. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706, 1305, 3105, 3344, 5362, 7521 (1994) (Rulemaking is covered by § 553). The president can impose preliminary procedures and standards on federal agencies to achieve the administration's objectives such as consistency or cost-benefit analysis. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1994).
2. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706, 1305, 3105, 3344, 5362, 7521 (1994) (Rulemaking is covered by § 553). The president can impose preliminary procedures and standards on federal agencies to achieve the administration's objectives such as consistency or cost-benefit analysis. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1994).
3. See 2 KENNETH C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7.8 (2d ed. 1978) ("A legislative rule is the product of an exercise of delegated legislative power to make law through rules. An interpretative rule is any rule an agency issues without exercising delegated legislative power to make law through rules."). See also Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 232-36 (1974) (requiring a legislative-type rule); Batterton v. Marshall, 648 F.2d 694, 705 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
4. Interpretative rules are expressly exempted from the notice and comment procedures. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (1994). However, there are cases holding that interpretative rules that have a substantial impact are subject to the notice and comment procedure of the APA. See, e.g., United States Dep't of Labor v. Kast Metals Corp., 744 F.2d 1145, 1153 (5th Cir. 1984) (citation omitted); Lewis-Mota v. Secretary of Labor, 469 F.2d 478, 482 (2d Cir. 1972) (citations omitted). Such cases have been criticized. See, e.g., Rivera v. Becerra, 714 F.2d 887, 889-91 (9th Cir. 1983); 2 DAVIS, supra note 2, § 7.15. Professor Davis has observed that "[m]ost 'rules' in the broadest sense are within one or more of the various exceptions to § 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act." 1 DAVIS, supra note 2, § 6.25.
5. These are "military or foreign affairs function[s] of the United States" and "a matter relating to agency management or personnel or to public property, loans, grants, benefits, or contracts." 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(1)-(2).
6. This excludes negotiated rulemaking that is a variant or hybrid of the other procedures. See Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990, 5 U.S.C. §§ 561-570 (1994).
7. Agencies cannot create new rulemaking procedures that shortcut the APA. See United States v. Picciotto, 875 F.2d 345, 347 (D.C. Cir. 1989). Nor can courts impose new procedures on agencies. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 543 (1978) (holding that courts should not require rulemaking procedures that Congress has not imposed "[a]bsent constitutional constraints or extremely compelling circumstances. . .").