Bad politicians

Journal of Public Economics

Volumn 88, Issue 3-4, 2004, Pages 759-782

  Caselli, Francesco ^a   Morelli, Massimo ^b  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Citizen candidates; Competence; Elected officials' corruption

Indexed keywords

EID: 0345058995     PISSN: 00472727     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(03)00023-9     Document Type: Article

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