Competition of politicians for incentive contracts and elections

Public Choice

Volumn 121, Issue 1-2, 2004, Pages 157-177

  Gersbach, Hans ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF HEIDELBERG   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 17544363523     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-004-0555-z     Document Type: Article

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