Credibility of Optimal Monetary Delegation

American Economic Review

Volumn 87, Issue 5, 1997, Pages 911-920

  Jensen, Henrik ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF COPENHAGEN   (Denmark)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0000628071     PISSN: 00028282     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (25)

1. Alesina, Alberto and Summers, Lawrence H. "Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence." Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, May 1993, 25(2), pp. 151-62.
2. al-Nowaihi, Ali and Levine, Paul. "Independent but Accountable: Walsh Contracts and the Credibility Problem." Global Economic Institutions Working Paper Series No. 11, May 1996.
3. Barro, Robert J. "Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy with Incomplete Information." Journal of Monetary Economics, January 1986, 17(1), pp. 3-20.
4. Barro, Robert J. and Gordon, David B. "A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model." Journal of Political Economy, August 1983a, 91(4), pp. 589-610.
5. _. "Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy." Journal of Monetary Economics, July 1983b, 12(1), pp. 101-21.
6. Calvo, Guillermo A. "On the Time Consistency of Optimal Policy in a Monetary Economy." Econometrica, November 1978, 46(6), pp. 1411-28.
7. Canzoneri, Matthew B. "Monetary Policy Games and the Role of Private Information." American Economic Review, December 1985, 75(5), pp. 1056-70.
8. Dolado, Juan J.; Griffiths, Mark and Padilla, A. Jorge. "Delegation in International Monetary Policy Games." European Economic Review, May 1994, 38(5), pp. 1057-69.
9. Fershtman, Chaim and Judd, Kenneth L. "Equilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly." American Economic Review, December 1987, 77(5), pp. 927-40.
10. Fischer, Stanley. "Modern Approaches to Central Banking," in Forrest Capie, Stanley Fischer, Charles Goodhart, and Norbert Schnadt, eds., The future of central banking. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995, pp. 262-308.
11. Flood, Robert P. and Isard, P. "Monetary Policy Strategies." International Monetary Fund Staff Papers, September 1989, 36(3), pp. 612-32.
12. Fratianni, Michele; von Hagen, Jürgen and Waller, Christopher J. "Central Banking as a Political Principal-Agent Problem." Economic Inquiry, April 1997, 35(2), pp. 378-93.
13. Grilli, Vittorio; Masciandaro, Donato and Tabellini, Guido. "Political and Monetary Institutions and Public Financial Policies in the Industrial Countries." Economic Policy, October 1991, 6(2), pp. 341-92.
14. Herrendorf, Berthold. "Inflation Targeting as a Substitute for Precommitment." Mimeo, University of Warwick, 1996.
15. Kydland, Finn E. and Prescott, Edward C. "Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans." Journal of Political Economy, June 1977, 85(3), pp. 473-91.
16. Lockwood, Ben. "Uniqueness of Markov-Perfect Equilibrium in Infinite-Time Affine-Quadratic Differential Games." Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, May 1996, 20(5), pp. 751-66.
17. Lohmann, Susanne. "Optimal Commitment in Monetary Policy: Credibility versus flexibility." American Economic Review, March 1992, 82(1), pp. 273-86.
18. McCallum, Bennett T. "Two Fallacies Concerning Central-Bank Independence." American Economic Review, May 1995 (Papers and Proceedings), 85 (2), pp. 207-11.
19. Persson, Torsten and Tabellini, Guido. "Designing Institutions for Monetary Stability." Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, December 1993, 39, pp. 53-84.
20. Rogoff, Kenneth. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to a Monetary Target." Quarterly Journal of Economics, November 1985, 100(4), pp. 1169-89.
21. Stokey, Nancy L. "Reputation and Time Consistency." American Economic Review, May 1989 (Papers and Proceedings), 79(2), pp. 134-39.
22. Svensson, Lars E. O. "Optimal Inflation Targets, 'Conservative' Central Banks, and Linear Inflation Contracts." American Economic Review, March 1997,87(1), pp. 98-114.
23. Vickers, John. "Delegation and the Theory of the Firm." Economic Journal, Supplement 1985, 95, pp. 138-47.
24. Walsh, Carl E. "Optimal Contracts for Independent Central Bankers." American Economic Review, March 1995a, 85(1), pp. 150-67.
25. _. "Is New Zealand's Reserve Bank Act of 1989 an Optimal Central Bank Contract?" Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, November 1995b, Part 1, 27(4), pp. 1179-91.