The information-aggregation approach to political institutions

European Economic Review

Volumn 43, Issue 4-6, 1999, Pages 791-800

  Piketty, Thomas ^a  

^a CEPREMAP   (France)

Author keywords

Information aggregation; Political economy; Political institutions

Indexed keywords

INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK; POLITICAL ECONOMY; POLITICAL SYSTEM;

EID: 0032773001     PISSN: 00142921     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0014-2921(98)00094-4     Document Type: Article

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