Dividing resources by flexible majority rules

Social Choice and Welfare

Volumn 23, Issue 2, 2004, Pages 295-308

  Gersbach, Hans ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF HEIDELBERG   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 4744356199     PISSN: 01761714     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00355-004-0314-6     Document Type: Article

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