Inflation forecast targeting: Implementing and monitoring inflation targets

European Economic Review

Volumn 41, Issue 6, 1997, Pages 1111-1146

  Svensson, Lars E O ^a,b,c  

^a STOCKHOLM UNIVERSITY   (Sweden)

^b CEPR   (United Kingdom)

^c NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH   (United States)

Author keywords

Forecast targeting; Inflation targeting; Monitoring monetary policy

Indexed keywords

EID: 0000529574     PISSN: 00142921     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0014-2921(96)00055-4     Document Type: Article

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