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Social Choice and Welfare

Volumn 23, Issue 3, 2004, Pages 449-464

Why one person one vote?

(1) Gersbach, Hans a

a UNIVERSITY OF HEIDELBERG (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 10044278348 PISSN: 01761714 EISSN: None Source Type: Journal
DOI: 10.1007/s00355-003-0271-5 Document Type: Article

Times cited : (7)

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